Certainly, the form in which the order of our discourse has led us to establish the characters of the concept--that of enumeration, the one character being connected with the other by means of an "also"--is, logically, a very crude form, and must be refined and corrected. Above all, if we have spoken of _characters_ of the concept, we have done so in order to adhere to the usual mode of expression. The concept cannot have characters, in the plural, but _character,_ that one character which is proper to it. What this is has been seen; the concept is concrete-universal two words which designate one thing only, and can also grammatically become one: "transcendental," or whatever other word be chosen from those already coined, or that may be coined for the occasion. The other determinations are not _characters_ of the concept, but affirm its _relations_ with the spiritual activity in general, of which it is a special form, and with the other special forms of this activity. In the first relation, the concept is spiritual; in relation with the æsthetic activity, it is cognitive or expressive, and enters into the general theoretic-expressive form; in relation with the practical activity, it is not, as concept, either useful or moral, but as a concrete act of the spirit it must be called useful and moral. The exposition of the characters of the concept, correctly thought, resolves itself into the compendious exposition of the whole Philosophy of spirit, in which the concept takes its place in its unique character, that is to say, in itself. [Sidenote: _Objections relating to the unreality of the pure concept and to the impossibility of demonstrating it._]