No reliance can be placed on any warning being conveyed to a mariner by a fall of temperature, either of the air or sea, on approaching ice. Some decrease in temperature has occasionally been recorded, but more often none has been observed. Sir Ernest Shackleton was, however, of opinion that-- if there was no wind and the temperature fell abnormally for the time of the year, I would consider that I was approaching an area which might have ice in it. ACTION THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN TAKEN. The question is what ought the master to have done. I am advised that with the knowledge of the proximity of ice which the master had, two courses were open to him: The one was to stand well to the southward instead of turning up to a westerly course; the other was to reduce speed materially as night approached. He did neither. The alteration of the course at 5.50 p. m. was so insignificant that it can not be attributed to any intention to avoid ice. This deviation brought the vessel back to within about 2 miles of the customary route before 11.30 p. m. And there was certainly no reduction of speed. Why, then, did the master persevere in his course and maintain his speed? The answer is to be found in the evidence. It was shown that for many years past, indeed, for a quarter of a century or more, the practice of liners using this track when in the vicinity of ice at night had been in clear weather to keep the course, to maintain the speed and to trust to a sharp lookout to enable them to avoid the danger. This practice, it was said, had been justified by experience, no casualties having resulted from it. I accept the evidence as to the practice and as to the immunity from casualties which is said to have accompanied it. But the event has proved the practice to be bad. Its root is probably to be bound in competition and in the desire of the public for quick passages rather than in the judgment of navigators. But unfortunately experience appeared to justify it. In these circumstances I am not able to blame Capt. Smith. He had not the experience which his own misfortune has afforded to those whom he has left behind, and he was doing only that which other skilled men would have done in the same position. It was suggested at the bar that he was yielding to influences which ought not to have affected him; that the presence of Mr. Ismay on board and the knowledge which he perhaps had of a conversation between Mr. Ismay and the chief engineer at Queenstown about the speed of the ship and the consumption of coal probably induced him to neglect precautions which he would otherwise have taken. But I do not believe this. The evidence shows that he was not trying to make any record passage or indeed any exceptionally quick passage. He was not trying to please anybody, but was exercising his own discretion in the way he thought best. He made a mistake, a very grievous mistake, but one in which, in face of the practice and of past