The positions for machine guns should not be in one and the same line, and they should be placed at wide intervals. At least two positions should be provided for each gun, and a second series of positions in rear, commanding those in front, should also be provided. The machine guns should be allotted to their positions by sections, each gun being so placed that its fire crosses that of the other when possible. Section commanders should be responsible for having all ranges from their respective positions taken and written up in each emplacement. They must arrange with the O.C. of that portion of the position to which they are allotted the time and signal (if any) for opening fire; the exact moment should be left to the discretion of the section commander as a rule, the O.C. merely indicating the stage of the attack up to which fire is to be reserved, and great care should be taken not to open fire before this stage has been reached. Every endeavour should be made to ensure co-operation between the machine-gun units in reserving fire till the shortest range has been reached by the attack and a really good target presented. Nothing can justify a machine gun opening fire from a concealed position until its fire will give the best results that can be expected from that place, and to ensure this it is necessary that the target is big and vulnerable, the range close, and the fire unexpected by the enemy. Captain von Beckmann, speaking of the Russo-Japanese War, says: “Premature fire upon unsuitable targets at long range is to be deprecated. The greater the surprise, and the shorter the time within which heavy loss is inflicted, the greater the morale effect produced. At the battle of Hai-kou-tai on January 27th, 1905, a Japanese company attacked Sha-shan. Four Russian machine guns _opened fire at about 1,100 yards upon the extended firing line, without causing any serious loss or affecting its advance_. On the other hand, the Japanese on March 1st had _approached to within 200 or 300 yards_ of the Russian position at Wang-chia-wo-pang and were beginning the final assault. Two Russian machine guns _suddenly came into action_, and the Japanese assault _was repulsed with heavy loss_ owing to the annihilating fire.” These two instances well illustrate the right and wrong way of using machine guns in the defence. Where a battery is allotted to one section of the defence the guns should be distributed two or four along the front and one or more on each flank. Single guns may be used in the defence where a section cannot be spared, as the assistance of a supporting gun is not essential to its safety when behind entrenchments. In the first instance guns may be kept in rear of the position until the direction of the attack has been ascertained, provided they are able to occupy their positions unseen. Machine guns at salients and on the flanks are of great value in defending a position.