Magna Carta, and Other AddressesGuthrie, William D. (William Dameron)
History
Magna Carta, and Other Addresses
Guthrie, William D. (William Dameron)
Constitutional law -- United States
On the contrary, it had long been regarded in England as settled law
that the subject was entitled to an effective legal remedy for any
invasion of his legal rights by the king or the government. He had a
right to sue the king for the restitution of property or money or for
the recovery of damages for breach of contract, and to sue officers
of the crown for any tortious acts. The practice established for
centuries had been to present to the king a petition praying leave to
sue him, and the custom had been for the king as of course to endorse
on the petition his fiat that right be done. Thereafter the action
proceeded as any other action between subject and subject. This right
was conceded to aliens as well as to subjects. Although the leave to
sue was nominally or theoretically granted as a matter of grace and not
upon compulsion, it was in fact the constitutional duty of the king to
grant it, and it was seldom denied. Under the common law, the subject
was entitled as a matter of right--as one of the immemorial liberties
of Englishmen--to inform his king of the nature of any grievance, and
thereupon, in the language of Blackstone, "as the law presumes that
to know of any injury and to redress it are inseparable in the royal
breast, it then issues, as of course, in the king's own name, his
orders to his judges to do justice to the party aggrieved."
The nature of the proceeding under a petition of right has been passed
upon by the Supreme Court of the United States in several cases, and
its decisions clearly show that the remedy is not to be regarded as
a mere matter of grace, but as a right to sue and obtain redress in
the class of cases to which it applies. Thus, Chief Justice Marshall,
delivering the opinion of the court in Marbury _vs._ Madison at the
February term, 1803, said: "In Great Britain the king himself is sued
in the respectful form of a petition, and he never fails to comply with
the judgment of his court."[29] In United States _vs._ O'Keefe the
court at the December term, 1870, examined the nature of the remedy
in construing the act of Congress of July 27, 1868, now section 1068
of the United States Revised Statutes. Mr. Justice Davis, speaking
for the court, said: "This valuable privilege, secured to the subject
in the time of Edward the First, is now crystallized in the common
law of England. As the prayer of the petition is grantable _ex debito
justitiae_, it is called a petition of right, and is a judicial
proceeding, to be tried like suits between subject and subject.... It
is of no consequence that, theoretically speaking, the permission of
the crown is necessary to the filing of the petition, because it is the
duty of the king to grant it, and the right of the subject to demand
it. And we find that it is never refused, except in very extraordinary
cases, and this proves nothing against the existence of the right....
If the mode of proceeding to enforce it be formal and ceremonious,
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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