Medical Jurisprudence, Forensic medicine and Toxicology. Vol. 1Witthaus, R. A. (Rudolph August)
Science
Medical Jurisprudence, Forensic medicine and Toxicology. Vol. 1
Witthaus, R. A. (Rudolph August)
Medical jurisprudence; Poisons; Toxicology
treats as a fact—viz., whether a given person is or is not angry,
or intoxicated, or irrational—the witness is really testifying to
the result, in his own mind, of his observations of the condition
and conduct of the person who is under investigation, when compared
with a standard which the witness has erected for himself. Hence such
results are really matters of opinion evidence, pure and simple. Other
examples of a like character are found in statements as to weight,
height, distance, speed, and the like, as to which men of common
powers of observation, who are not strictly experts, are, because
of convenience and necessity and the probability of reasonable and
ordinary accuracy, commonly permitted to give their own judgment and
conclusions as evidence.
_All Witnesses Often Permitted to Draw and State Conclusions in Matters
involving Numerous and Complicated Details._—Thus the practical
necessity of the administration of justice has led to the establishment
of the rule, that where the details of an occurrence are numerous and
complicated, and are incapable of precise description by ordinary
observers, witnesses are permitted to use, in testifying, general
expressions which really embody their conclusions from the facts or
details observed by them. Greenleaf on Evidence, Section 440, note A;
Wharton on Evidence, Section 434.
Wharton says that “the distinction between expert witnesses and
ordinary witnesses is this: the non-expert witness testifies to
conclusions which may be verified by the adjudicating tribunal; the
expert, to conclusions which cannot be so verified. The non-expert
gives the results of a process of reasoning familiar to every-day life;
the expert gives the results of a process of reasoning which can be
determined only by special scientists.” See also People _v._ Fernandez,
35 N.Y., 49. People _v._ Deacons, 109 N.Y., 374-382.
This learned writer (Wharton) also says, at Section 437 of the same
treatise:
“Where conclusions depend upon facts whose evidential weight can only
be determined by those familiar with a particular specialty, then these
conclusions may be given by experts in such specialty.” Such also is
the exact derivative meaning of the word expert, it being derived from
the Latin word “_expertus_,” meaning, literally, “experienced,” and
hence skilled by experience.
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