Medical Jurisprudence, Forensic medicine and Toxicology. Vol. 1Witthaus, R. A. (Rudolph August)
Science
Medical Jurisprudence, Forensic medicine and Toxicology. Vol. 1
Witthaus, R. A. (Rudolph August)
Medical jurisprudence; Poisons; Toxicology
in every civilized community the retention by a judge of presents from
suitors visits him not only with disqualification but disgrace. Hence
it is that, apart from the partisan character of their opinions, their
utterances, now that they have as a class become the retained agents
of the parties, have lost all judicial authority and are entitled only
to the weight which sound and consistent criticism will award to the
testimony itself. In making this criticism a large allowance must be
made for the bias necessarily belonging to men retained to advocate
a cause, who speak not as to fact but as to opinion, and who are
selected, on all moot questions, either from their prior advocacy of
them or from their readiness to adopt the opinion to be proved. In this
sense we may adopt the strong language of Lord Kenyon, that skilled
witnesses come with such a bias on their minds to support the cause
in which they are embarked, that hardly any weight should be given to
their evidence.”
This author then proceeds to show that under the civil law system the
conclusions of experts were formerly treated as unassailable facts,
but under the English and American common law system this is not the
case, but their testimony is to be weighed by the court. He says:
“The grounds on which the conclusion is reached may be asked for: the
expert’s capacity for drawing conclusions, as well as his premises,
may be assailed. Cases of conflict are to be determined, not by the
number of witnesses, but by the weight of their testimony, and though
the opinion of an expert of high character may be entitled to great
respect, yet if questioned, its authority must ultimately rest upon the
truth, material and formal, of the reasoning on which it depends.”
Judge Davis, of the Supreme Court of Maine, in Neil’s case (cited
in Wharton and Stille’s “Medical Jurisprudence,” Vol. I., Section
294), said: “If there is any kind of testimony that is not only of no
value, but even worse than that, it is in my judgment that of medical
experts. They may be able to state the diagnosis of a disease more
learnedly, but upon the question whether it had at a given time reached
a stage that the subject of it was incapable of making a contract, or
irresponsible for his acts, the opinions of his neighbors, of men of
good common sense, would be worth more than that of all the experts in
the country.”
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account