Statute was never intended to be taken away by _primo Mariæ_. But to this point, _Jones_ and _Whitlock_, would not deliver their opinions; but admitting the Statute 34 _Hen._ 8. be in force, yet they all resolved, the defendant’s[95] plea was naught, and not warranted by the Statute; for he pleads, that he applied and ministered medicines, plaisters, drinks, _Ulceribus Morbis et Maladiis, Calculo Strangurio, Febribus et aliis in Statuto mentionatis_; so he leaves out the principal word in the Statute (_Externis_), and doth not refer and shew that he ministered potions for the Stone, Strangulation or Ague, as the Statute appoints to these three diseases only and to no other; and by his plea his potions may be ministered to any other sickness; wherefore they all held his plea was naught for this cause, and that judgment was well given against him; whereupon judgment was affirmed.” This case is reported more fully in _Brownlow_, p. 126. See also _Goodall_, p. 221 to p. 259. But though this statute 34 _Hen._ 8th gave a very considerable latitude to unlicensed practice, the decision of the House of Lords in the case of _Rose_ has rendered it yet more difficult to determine what is a practising of Physic within the statute 14 _Hen._ 8th. This case arose on an action in the King’s Bench for practising Physic within seven miles of London without licence; the case upon a special verdict was, that the Defendant being an Apothecary by trade was sent to by _John Seale_[96], then sick of a certain distemper, and he having seen him, and being informed of the said distemper, did without prescription or advice of a Doctor and without any fee for advice, compound and send the said _John Seale_ several parcels of physic as proper for his said distemper, only taking the price of his drugs; and if this were a practising of physic, such as is prohibited by the Statute was the question: and after several arguments the Court at last unanimously agreed, That practising of Physic within this statute consists, 1st, In judging of the disease and its nature, constitution of the patient, and many other circumstances. 2ndly, In judging of the fittest and properest remedy for the disease. And 3dly, In directing and ordering the application of the remedy to the diseased. And that the proper business of an Apothecary is to make and compound, or prepare the prescriptions of the doctor pursuant to his directions. It was also agreed, That the Defendant’s taking upon himself to send physic to a patient as proper for his distemper without taking ought for his pains, is plainly a taking upon himself to judge of the disease and fitness of the remedy, as also the executive or directing part. _Et per tot. Cur._ The Plaintiff had judgment. 6 _Mod._ 44. 16 _Vin. Abr._ 341. Against this judgment the Defendant _Rose_ brought a Writ of Error to the House of Lords, “That judgment having been given in the Queen’s Bench against