betrust them with place of public charge and command. This oath, when it came abroad, he (Mr. Williams) vehemently withstood, and dissuaded sundry from it, partly because it was, he said, Christ’s prerogative to have his office established by an oath; partly because an oath was part of God’s worship, and God’s worship was not to be put upon carnal persons, as he conceived many of the people to be. So the Court was forced to desist from that proceeding.” The reasons assigned by Mr. Cotton for Mr. Williams’ opposition to the oath are, we suspect, not all the reasons which really moved him to this course. He probably viewed the act of the Court in absolving the citizens from the oath which they had already taken, and substituting another, as an illegal assumption of power. It might be understood to claim for the Court an authority superior to the charter, for it omitted the clause of the former oath, which required of the subject obedience to laws which should be “lawfully” made by the Court, and, instead of it, obliged men to swear to submit to the “_wholesome_” regulations which might be established. As the charter prohibited the passage of laws contrary to the laws of England, the first oath bound the citizen to obey the Court only while they adhered to the charter; but the new oath required submission to all the “wholesome” acts of the government, who were, of course, the sole judges of the wholesomeness of their own measures. Mr. Cotton says, that the oath was only _offered_, not imposed, but it was, by a subsequent act of the Court, enforced on every man above the age of sixteen years, on penalty of punishment at the discretion of the Court.[78] To this oath, under such circumstances, Mr. Williams, as a friend of liberty, was opposed. He would not renounce an oath which he had taken, and substitute another, which bound him to obey whatever laws the magistrates might deem wholesome. The reason assigned for the new oath, moreover, was to guard against “Episcopal and malignant practices.” This gave it the appearance of a law to restrain liberty of conscience; and Mr. Williams’ principles were totally opposed to any measure which tended to that result, however specious its professed object might be. If these views are correct, Mr. Williams’ opposition to oaths in this case resolves itself into an inflexible adherence to his great doctrine of unfettered religious liberty; a doctrine which, more than any thing else, drew upon him the jealousy and dislike of the magistrates and the clergy. In July, he was again summoned to Boston.