The first news, which must have been unpleasant to Marshal Massena, was the capture of Coimbra, with all the French wounded, by a corps of Portuguese militia, under Colonel Trant. The loss of the troops was not alone to be lamented in this case; it brought with it the disastrous conviction, that the French army was insulated on the ground on which it stood; no line of communication, no extent of country in subjection, from which to draw resources, remained to it. Wherever a Frenchman stood, for the moment, he commanded and desolated the spot; removed from it, all was in hostility against him. The march of the French, through Portugal to the lines, was most singular. The troops seldom saw an inhabitant; they could procure no guides; deserters from them, or prisoners, could never state the towns or villages from whence they came, though, in some instances, they had been weeks in the same places; they had seen no native to instruct them in their names. In this state of things, the French army began early to suffer from privations of every sort; its foraging parties were scouring the country in the rear, and upon their success depended chiefly the provisioning of the troops. The fatigue and sickness, consequent on this mode of living, were considerable. The French soldiers were generally bivouacked along the line they occupied, which, without shelter in the rainy season, increased the misery of their situation. By these causes, their army gradually diminished; while, on the contrary, that under Lord Wellington, excellently provided with all that was necessary, and mostly under cover in the villages within the position, was gaining strength and improving in discipline every day. The Spanish corps, under the orders of the Marquis of Romana, had joined the allied army from the frontiers of Estremadura; so that the force at this time, (the end of October and beginning of November) within the lines, was considerably greater than that of the enemy. Under these circumstances, Lord Wellington saw there was an opportunity of attacking Massena with advantage. The problem, whether it were wise to do so or not, engaged his most serious attention. He was persuaded, that if he attacked, he could secure a victory; to attempt it he was induced by every personal consideration; the glory which would have accrued to him in success would at that time have been immense; in England the word of Buonaparte, that his eagles should be planted on the towers of Lisbon, was generally looked upon as a decree which no talent or ability could avert; to have learnt at such a time that our army had defeated the boasted instruments Of this prophesying emperor, would have carried the man who executed such a plan to the pinnacle of greatness. Yet this inducement, as well as the anxious wish of the whole army to attack, had no effect. Lord Wellington was persuaded that the sounder line of conduct was to wait with patience, and in safety, the mischief, which he was satisfied would