Lord Wellington returned to his head-quarters at Villa Formoso on the 28th of April. Massena had collected his army at Ciudad Rodrigo; it consisted of the 2d, 6th, 8th, and 9th corps, with the cavalry and artillery which belonged to them, and of 1,500 cavalry of the Imperial Guard, commanded by the Duke of Istria. The whole force amounted to 40,000 men, the remnant of the army of Portugal, which, six months before, had counted above 90,000 rank and file. Lord Wellington saw the approach of the enemy without dismay; the French force was superior to his own,—its object, the relief of Almeida. To thwart this attempt it was necessary to accept a battle; and, from the situation of Almeida, on the right of the Coa, the position to defend the approach to it must necessarily be taken up in front of the town, thus having the river in rear of the allied army. The banks of the Coa are extremely steep; there are few fords at which it can be passed, none in the part of it near Almeida serviceable for an army: the bridge over it, under the guns of that fortress, is extremely narrow, and at the time was nearly impassable. The bridge at Castel de Bom was also a most difficult communication. From Ciudad Rodrigo a road leads to Sabugal, where there is another bridge over the Coa, which, in case of defeat, might have served the allied army to retire over. Lord Wellington (though not entirely from his own conviction) determined to take up a defensive position, covering both the approach to Almeida, and the road to Sabugal. He perceived, from the beginning, that this double object was more than the forces he had with him might be able to maintain; the extension to the road above mentioned weakened his position; whereas, he was persuaded that, by confining himself to the protection of Almeida alone, he could bid defiance to the enemy. The object, however, of defending the entry by Sabugal into Portugal, and of securing a second road to retire upon, was not without mature consideration to be given up; and Lord Wellington felt convinced, that if the necessity of so doing should arise, he could always withdraw his army to the more concentrated position.