The attention of the government was early drawn to the proceedings of the Seminole Indians, who had commenced hostilities with circumstances of great barbarity. Orders were sent to General Jackson to repair to the seat of war with such troops as he could collect, and the Georgia militia, and to reduce the Indians by force, pursuing them into Florida, if they should retreat for refuge there. About this time the republic of Buenos Ayres sent an agent urging an acknowledgment of their independence. Their claim was in unison with the popular feeling in the South; but elsewhere throughout the nation public opinion was divided, as were also the members of the President's cabinet. Mr. Adams declared himself against such recognition, as it would interfere with a negotiation with Spain for the purchase of the Floridas. He urged, also, that McGregor, the adventurer, who, under a pretence of authority from Buenos Ayres, had taken possession of Amelia Island, should be compelled to withdraw his troops by a naval force sent for that purpose. On this measure, also, both the nation and the cabinet were divided. Mr. Clay, in the House of Representatives, took ground in opposition to the policy of the administration, avowing openly his intention of bringing forward a motion in favor of recognizing the independence of Buenos Ayres. To control or overthrow the executive by the weight of the House of Representatives, was apparently his object.[1] [1] A committee appointed by the House of Representatives, on McGregor's possession of Amelia Island, waited on Mr. Adams, and inquired concerning the proposed proceedings of the executive, and his powers in that respect. Mr. Adams took occasion to state and explain to them the effects of "the _secret laws_, as they were called, and which," he said, "were singular anomalies of our system, having grown out of that error in our constitution which confers upon the legislative assemblies the power of declaring war, which, in the theory of government, according to Montesquieu and Rousseau, is strictly an executive act. But, as we have made it legislative, whenever secrecy is necessary for an operation of the executive involving the question of peace and war, Congress must pass a _secret_ law to give the President power. Now, secrecy is contrary to one of the first principles of legislation, but the absurdity flows from having given to Congress, instead of the executive, the power of declaring war. Of these secret laws there are four, and one resolution; and one of the laws, that of the 28th of June, 1812, is so secret, that to this day it cannot be found among the rolls of the department. Another consequence has followed from this clumsy political machinery. The injunction of secrecy was removed on the 6th of July, 1812, from the laws previously passed by a vote of the House of Representatives, and yet the laws have