Mental Evolution in Man: Origin of Human FacultyRomanes, George John
Science
Mental Evolution in Man: Origin of Human Faculty
Romanes, George John
Evolution; Psychology, Comparative
The next thing I wish to make clear is that concepts of the lower
order of which I speak, notwithstanding that they are the simplest
kind of concepts possible, are already something more than the names
of _particular_ ideas: they are the names of what I have called
_generic_ ideas, or recepts. We may search through the whole dictionary
of any language and not find a single word which stands as a name
for a truly particular idea—_i.e._ for the memory of a particular
percept. Proper names are those which most nearly approach this
character; but even proper names are really names of recepts (as
distinguished from particular percepts), seeing that every object to
which they are applied is a highly complex object, presenting many and
diverse qualities, all of which require to be registered in memory as
appertaining to that object if it is again to be recognized as the same.
Names, then, are not concerned with particular ideas, strictly so
called: concepts, even of the lowest order, have to do with generic
ideas. Furthermore, the generic ideas with which they have to do are
for the most part highly generic: even before a recept is old enough to
be baptized—or sufficiently far developed to be admitted as a member
of the body conceptual,—it is already a highly organized product
of ideation. We have seen in the last chapter how wonderfully far
the combining power of imagination is able to go without the aid of
language; and the consequence of this is, that before the advent of
language mind is already stored with a rich accumulation of orderly
ideas, grouped together in many systems of logical coherency. When,
therefore, the advent of language does take place, it is needless that
this work of logical grouping should be recommenced _ab initio_. What
language does is to take up the work of grouping where it has been left
by generic ideation; and if it is found expedient to name any generic
ideas, it is the more generic as well as the less generic that are
selected for the purpose. In short, immense as is the organizing power
of the Logos, it does not come upon the scene of its creative power to
find only that which is without form and void: rather does it find a
fair structure of no mean order of system, shaped by prior influences,
and, so far as thus shaped, a veritable cosmos.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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