Mental Philosophy: Including the Intellect, Sensibilities, and WillHaven, Joseph
Philosophy
Mental Philosophy: Including the Intellect, Sensibilities, and Will
Haven, Joseph
Psychology
_This the Basis of mental Reproduction._--It is to this general
principle of suggestion or association that we are indebted for all
mental reproduction. It is only as one idea or feeling is suggested by
some other which has gone before, and with which it is in some way, and
for some reason, associated in our minds, that any former thought or
sensation is recalled, that any object which we have perceived or any
scene through which we have passed, is mentally reproduced. It is thus
that the sight of an object brings to mind occurrences connected with
it in our history, that the same recalls the thing, that the words of a
language bring to mind the ideas which they denote, or the characters
on the musical staff, the tones which they represent.
_Not a distinct Faculty._--It has been customary to speak of
association of ideas as a distinct faculty of the mind. It is not
properly so ranked. It is a law of the mind rather than a faculty of
it--a rule or method of its action in certain cases; and the particular
power of mind to which this rule applies is that form of simple
conception which we term mental reproduction.
_The Term Suggestion preferred by Brown._--In place of the term
association, Dr. Brown would prefer the term suggestion as more
correct. To speak of the association of ideas implies that they have
previously coëxisted in the mind, and that the one now recalls the
other in consequence of that previous coëxistence. That this is often
the case is doubtless true, but it is also true that in many cases one
idea suggests another with which it has not previously been associated
in our minds. It is not necessary to the suggestion that there should
be any prior association. An object seen _for the first time_ suggests
many relative conceptions. The sight of a giant suggests the idea of a
friend of diminutive stature, not because the two ideas have previously
been associated, or the two objects have coëxisted, either in
perception or conception, but because it is a law of the mind that one
conception shall suggest another, either as similar, or as opposite,
or in some other way related to it. This may be as truly a law of the
mind, independent of association, as that light falling on the retina
shall produce vision. It may seem mysterious that this should be so.
Is it not equally mysterious that ideas which have formerly coëxisted
should recall each other? The real mystery is the recurrence in any
mode, and from any source, of the idea, without the recurrence of the
external producing cause. For these reasons, Dr. Brown prefers the term
_suggestion_ to _association_.
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