And yet all those Officers, who refus'd their Consent to the Siege of _Barcelona_, offer'd to march into the Country, and attempt any other Place, that was not provided with so strong and numerous a Garrison; taking it for granted, that no Town in _Catalonia, Barcelona_ excepted, could make long Resistance; and in case the Troops in that Garrison should pursue them, they then might have an Opportunity of fighting them at less Disadvantage in the open Field, than behind the Walls of a Place of such Strength. And, indeed, should they have issu'd out on any such Design, a Defeat of those Troops would have put the Province of _Catalonia_, together with the Kingdoms of _Aragon_ and _Valencia_, into the Hands of King _Charles_ more effectually than the taking _of Barcelona_ it self. Let it be observ'd, _en passant_, that by those Offers of the Land Officers in a Council of War, it is easy to imagine what would have been the Success of our Troops, had they march'd directly from _Valencia_ to _Madrid_. For if after two Months Alarm, it was thought reasonable, as well as practicable, to march into the open Country rather than attempt the Siege of _Barcelona_, where Forces equal, if not superior in Number, were ready to follow us at the Heels; what might not have been expected from an Invasion by our Troops when and where they could meet with little Opposition? But leaving the Consideration of what might have been, I shall now endeavour at least with great Exactness to set down some of the most remarkable Events from our taking to the Relief of _Barcelona_. The repeated Refusals of the Councils of War for undertaking the Siege of so strong a Place, with a Garrison so numerous, and those Refusals grounded upon such solid Reasons, against a Design so rash, reduc'd the General to the utmost Perplexity. The Court of King _Charles_ was immerg'd in complaint; all belonging to him lamenting the hard Fate of that Prince, to be brought into _Catalonia_ only to return again, without the Offer of any one Effort in his Favour. On the other Hand, our own Officers and Soldiers were highly dissatisfy'd, that they were reproach'd, because not dispos'd to enter upon and engage themselves in Impossibilities. And, indeed, in the Manner that the Siege was propos'd and insisted upon by the Prince of _Hesse_, in every of the several Councils of War, after the Loss of many Men, thrown away to no other purpose, but to avoid the Shame (as the Expression ran) of coming like Fools and going away like Cowards, it could have ended in nothing but a Retreat at last.