So I pass over all that, and hasten on now to the sequel. Memory finds few scenes to attract it in the days that followed Gettysburg. But I beg the reader to observe that I should have no scenes of a humiliating character to draw. Never was army less “whipped” than that of Lee after this fight! Do you doubt that statement, reader? Do you think that the Southerners were a disordered rabble, flying before the Federal bayonets? a flock of panic-stricken sheep, hurrying back to the Potomac, with the bay of the Federal war-dogs in their ears? That idea--entertained by a number of our Northern friends--is entirely fanciful. Lee’s army was not even shaken. It was fagged, hungry, out of ammunition, and it retired,--but not until it had remained for twenty-four hours in line of battle in front of the enemy, perfectly careless of, even inviting, attack. “I should have liked nothing better than to have been attacked,” said Longstreet, “and have no doubt I should have given those who tried, as bad a reception as Pickett received.”[1] [Footnote 1: His words.] It may be said that this is the boast of the defeated side. But General Meade, when interrogated before the war committee, stated the exact facts. “My opinion is now,” said Meade “that General Lee evacuated that position, not from the fear that he would be dislodged from it by any active operations on my part, but that he was fearful a force would be sent to Harper’s Ferry to cut off his communications.... That was what caused him to retire.” “Did you discover,” asked one of the committee, “after the battle of Gettysburg, any symptoms of demoralization in Lee’s army?” “No, sir,” was General Meade’s reply, “I saw nothing of that kind.”[1] [Footnote 1: General Meade’s testimony may be found in the Report on the Conduct of the War. Part I., p. 337.] That statement was just, and General Meade was too much of a gentleman and soldier to withhold it. He knew that his great adversary was still unshaken and dangerous--that the laurels snatched on Round Top and Cemetery Heights might turn to cypress, if the wounded lion were assailed in his own position. After the repulse of Pickett’s column on the third of July, Lee had the choice of two courses--to either attack again or retire. Meade was evidently determined to remain on the defensive. To engage him, Lee must once more charge the Cemetery Heights. But a third failure might be ruinous; the Confederate ammunition was nearly exhausted; the communications with the Potomac were threatened,--and Lee determined to retire. That is the true history of the matter. The force which fell back before Meade was an army of veterans, with unshaken nerves. It required only a glance to see that these men were still dangerous. They were ready to fight again, and many raged at the retreat. Like Lee’s “old war horse,” they were anxious to try another struggle, to have the enemy return the compliment, and come over to charge _them_!