Nullification, Secession, Webster's Argument, and the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions: Considered in Reference to the Constitution and HistoricallyLoring, Caleb William
History
Nullification, Secession, Webster's Argument, and the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions: Considered in Reference to the Constitution and Historically
Loring, Caleb William
Nullification (States' rights); Secession
The explanation further proceeds that it is in the last resort, “in
relation to the authorities of the other departments of the government,
and not in relation to the rights of the parties to the constitutional
compact, from which the judicial as well as the other departments, hold
their delegated trusts. On any other hypothesis, the delegation of
judicial power would annul the authority delegating it; and the
concurrence of this department with the others in usurped powers, might
subvert forever, and beyond the possible reach of any rightful remedy,
the very Constitution which all were instituted to preserve.” Perhaps it
may not be amiss to notice that all judicial power is over the rights of
the parties delegating it, the parties to the compact establishing the
government. The delegation is not confined to power over the authorities
of the other departments of the government, and the delegation of
judicial power does annul the authority delegating it as far as the
power delegated extends. It does not delegate usurpation of powers, nor
does it prevent revolution against usurped powers. This is what the
explanation means. But why the exception as to the other departments of
government? Usurpation by the judiciary over the other departments is
contrary to the conferred powers, and thereby affects the rights of the
parties to the compact. It is beyond what they delegate. Such usurpation
could very properly be resolved against: even more, resisted “in the
last resort.”
Then comes the assertion: “The authority of constitutions over
governments and of the sovereignty of the people over constitutions are
truths which are at all times to be kept in mind, and at no time
perhaps, more necessary than at present.”
As people make constitutions for the sole purpose of conferring powers
to governments over themselves which are to be superior and to compel
obedience, and punish those refusing it; and as the people always have
the power to make new constitutions or to amend them under the
regulations they have established; the suggestion of superiority seems a
glittering generality, at that time rather out of place.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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