Egoism however gives, in its highest form, a wide and wise consistency to actions. It pre-supposes a well-ordered mind capable of self-regulation and control. It takes a look all round, and it judges of the eventualities of actions. It sums up its own forces and motives, it takes account of its present and future surroundings and forms a judgment as to the most prudent course of action for securing the fittest life possible for itself and the greatest continuance of such life in the future. A wise and well-judged egoism is very valuable to the community, as well as profitable to the individual. It is not however essentially ethical, and is so only in so far as the individual is properly altruistic. If the egoist is not altruistic, he may become a curse to the society in which he lives, or if on a larger scale--a terrible scourge to humanity at large. Utilitarianism does not explain ethics, unless the word be accepted as co-extensive with the biological and sociological adjustments which have gone on during the upward growth. No doubt these were all utilities; and, therefore, utilitarianism is so far true. But since the process has been one of accompanying modified feeling, it is only half an explanation, only one feature of the general explanation. It was no common intellectual appreciation of the axiom "the greatest happiness for the greatest number," which caused the evolution of morals. The axiom was itself an after-thought. It may have great use in these days, as the expression of the outcome in feeling and in philosophic thought of processes of evolution, but it was not the ruling principle which produced the evolution. Accepted thus as the outcome, it may be the criterion and guide for future action in detailed adjustments and modifications of ethical judgments or political action, and may have an authority in modern times which it could not have had primordially. But its scope is limited to the formation of deliberate judgments, and it does not impel spontaneous praise or give any force to spontaneous blame. Its judgments are those of the calm reasoner which may very properly modify the opinions of society at large, and thus tend to form an improved conscience, but it will never make a moral impulse or form the base for an ethical ideal.