notion of what the word implies. In a loose way he opposes "same" to "different." Heraclitus saw that the water in a river is constantly changing. He who enters twice does not enter precisely the same body of water. What more natural, and what more fallacious, than to assert that he does not twice enter the same river? [30] Aristotle, Metaph., Bk. III, c. 5, § 7. SEC. 22. And well might Cratylus hold his peace and move his finger[31] when he had capped the climax with the statement that the same river could not be entered once. Heraclitus had merely denied sameness of the third kind to be sameness, since it implies duality. Cratylus, surprised by a discovery of duality where he had not before suspected it, will not allow the term where there is no duality whatever. It is not surprising that he came at last to be "of opinion that one ought to speak of nothing." Upon such a basis speech loses its significance. [31] Aristotle, Metaph. III, c. 5, § 7. SEC. 23. The Parmenidean argument for the eternity of Being[32] rests partly upon a confusion of the first kind of sameness with the fourth. Being has had no origin, for from what could it have been derived? Not from the non-existent, for this has no existence: and not from the existent, for it is itself the existent. The quibble about the non-existent we need not consider, though it is seriously repeated by more than one writer of our time. The last part of the argument, "not from the existent, for it is itself the existent," draws its whole force from the assumption that "it" is "the existent" as a thing is itself, or in the first sense of the word same. But if this be the case, the argument is a mere farce, an argument only in words. The phrase, "derived from the existent," means nothing at all unless it means that the existent in question is before the thing derived. To say it is the thing derived, is to reduce the words to nothing. If it mean anything to speak of the existent as derived from the existent, it is because each of these is _an_ existent--that is, a thing belonging to a class and distinguished from other members of this class by some difference. In this case the difference is that of before and after. An existent derived from an existent is the same with it only as things of a class are the same. If we choose to eliminate all differences and speak of "_the_ existent" we may do so; but then it is inadmissible to raise questions about its derivation, and bring in those very time distinctions between different "existents" which we are supposing absent. [32] Ueberweg. Hist. of Philos., Vol. I, § 19, N. Y., 1877, p. 57.