On the Ethics of NaturalismSorley, W. R. (William Ritchie)
Philosophy
On the Ethics of Naturalism
Sorley, W. R. (William Ritchie)
Ethics; Ethics, Evolutionary
[38] Fragment on Government, chap. v.; Works, i. 293. Cf. Principles
of Morals and Legislation, ch. iii. § 5, p. 14, where the Moral
Sanction is said to proceed from "such _chance_ persons in the
community as the person in question may happen in the course of his
life to have concerns with."
[39] Bentham, Fragment on Government, _loc. cit._
[40] Works, xi. 95; cf. J. Grote, Utilitarian Philosophy, p. 137.
[41] Principles of Morals and Legislation, ch. xix. (xvii.), § 7 ff.
[42] _Loc. cit._, § 8, p. 144.
[43] "Ought" is inappropriate here according to Bentham's principles,
since there is no question of punishment inflicted by a political or
social or religious superior.
[44] _Loc. cit._, § 20, p. 148.
[45] Moral and Political Philosophy, book ii. chap. iii.
[46] This is clearly recognised by Bentham: "The _actual_ end [as
distinguished from the right and proper end] of government is,"
he says, "in every political community, the greatest happiness of
those, whether one or many, by whom the powers of government are
exercised."--Constitutional Code, book i., Introd., § 2; Works, ix. 5.
[47] The Emotions and the Will, p. 264.
[48] Cf. Bain, The Emotions and the Will, p. 287. Professor Bain says
(Emotions, p. 276 n.), "we ought to have a written code of public
morality, or of the duties imposed by society, over and above what
parliament imposes, and this should not be a loosely written moral
treatise, but a strict enumeration of what society requires under
pain of punishment by excommunication or otherwise,--the genuine
offences that are not passed over." This would certainly be very
desirable, were it not from the nature of the case impracticable.
Popular judgment as to a man's conduct,--what society imposes,--is
one of the things most difficult to predict: it is under the
influence of most heterogeneous causes, personal, industrial,
religious, political, &c. I do not think, for instance, that any one
could safely undertake to describe exactly the kind of actions which
will infallibly call forth the censure of British public opinion, or
that of the smaller and intersecting groups into which society is
divided.
[49] Emotions, p. 288.
[50] I have spoken, for simplicity's sake, as if there were two kinds
of pleasure easily distinguishable. But the question is really much
more complicated.
[51] Utilitarianism, p. 57.
[52] Ibid., p. 53.
[53] Utilitarianism, p. 46. But no statement of the sociality of man
could be more explicit or satisfactory than that of Butler, Sermons,
i.
[54] Utilitarianism, p. 48.
[55] Fragments on Ethical Subjects (1876), p. 6.
[56] The Emotions and the Will, 3d ed., p. 295.
[57] Ibid., p. 111; cf. Mind, viii. 55: "The important exceptions to
the law of Pleasure and Pain are (1) Fixed Ideas, (2) Habits, and (3)
Disinterested action for others."
[58] Emotions, p. 438.
[59] Emotions, p. 121.
[60] Ibid., p. 271 ff.
[61] Ibid., p. 273.
[62] Ibid., p. 264.
[63] Fragments on Ethical Subjects, p. 8 f.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account