Von Pelet Narbonne puts down the general failure of Russian raids to the small value of the Cossacks, who were not trained in offensive dismounted action, nor possessed with a keen desire to use the sword. He then compares the method of the Japanese, whose tactics were more suited in his opinion to the intricate and mountainous nature of the country. They sent infantry with their cavalry, who carried out the unavoidable reconnaissance combat. This method certainly economized the cavalry, an arm in which the Japanese were very deficient. Again, the Japanese cavalry frequently met the Russian cavalry by dismounted fire from the mud walls of villages, and were mistaken by them for infantry. What, then, are the general conclusions at which we arrive?-- 1st. That big raids seldom have results which justify the loss and wear and tear of the horses and men. 2nd. That a raid must not be entered upon except with a special and adequate purpose and as a result of careful reconnaissance by spies and others. 3rd. That once entered upon, the leader must devote himself to carrying out his mission and not allow himself to be turned aside on any account whatever. 4th. That a small, swift, well-hidden raid on a line of communication made at a favourable moment may cause the detachment of a large number of troops, whose absence will be felt in the decisive battle. 5th. That raids against which the enemy has made preparations are purposeless, but are nevertheless often made by cavalry leaders, lest they should incur the reproach of having done nothing. 6th. That the first raids in a war are often successful. 7th. That a friendly country favours raids, and conversely an enemy’s country renders them difficult to the verge of impracticability. 8th. That cavalry should not be sent off on raids when required for action on a battlefield. 9th. That a raid is like any other detachment, _i.e._ if it succeeds in drawing away from the decisive point at the right time a stronger force than itself, it is justified; and therefore the chief point to consider in planning a raid is its timing. CHAPTER XVI THE TRAINING OF THE CAVALRY OFFICER “However much thou art read in theory, if thou hast no practice thou art ignorant. He is neither a sage philosopher nor an acute divine, but a beast of burden with a load of books. How can that brainless head know or comprehend whether he carries on his back a library or bundle of faggots?”--SADI, _Gulistan_, p. 273.