say the only kind of feeling of pain, which my observations do justify me in inferring, if (as I admit they may) they justify me in inferring any at all, is a feeling of pain of _my own._ They cannot possibly justify the belief in the existence of any such feeling _except_ one which stands to my perception in the same relation in which my feelings do stand to _my_ perceptions--one, that is to say, which is my own. I have no more reason to believe that the feeling of pain which probably precedes my perception of a movement in another person's body can be the feeling _of another person_, than, in my former example, I had reason to suppose that the hen, whose existence probably preceded that of a given egg, could be a hen, which had never been near the egg in question. The two cases are exactly analogous. I observe a feeling of pain _of my own_ preceding a perception _of my own._ I observe the two, that is to say, as standing to one another, in those relations (whatever they may be) in which any perception of mine stands to any other thought, perception or feeling of mine, and which are, at all events, different from any relation in which a perception or feeling of another person can stand to one of mine. I never perceive the feeling and the perception as standing in any other relation. In any case, therefore, where I do observe something like the perception, but do not observe the feeling, I can only be justified (_if_ justified in inferring any feeling at all), in inferring an unperceived feeling _of my own._