Philosophy and Religion: Six Lectures Delivered at CambridgeRashdall, Hastings
Religion
Philosophy and Religion: Six Lectures Delivered at Cambridge
Rashdall, Hastings
Christianity; Philosophy and religion
If one part of that system is referred to the divine Will, so must the
whole of it be. The souls, when they have entered animal bodies, must be
supposed to be subject to a system of laws which is of one piece with the
system of physical laws. If the physical part of the world-order is
referred to the divine Will, the psychical part of it must be equally
referred to {95} that Will. The souls might, indeed, conceivably have an
independent and original nature of their own capable of offering
resistance to the divine intentions. But we see, to say the least, no
indications of a struggle going on between an outside divine Will and
independent beings not forming a part of the divine scheme. At all
events, the result of this struggle, if struggle there be, is (so far as
we can observe) a system, complete and orderly, within the psychical
sphere as much as within the purely physical sphere. And in particular
the body is exactly fitted to the soul that is to inhabit it. We never
find the intellect of a Shakespeare in connexion with the facial angle of
a negro; bodies which resemble the bodies of their parents are connected
with souls between which a similar resemblance can be traced. If the
souls existed before birth, we must suppose those souls to be kept
waiting in a limbo of some kind till a body is prepared suitable for
their reception. We must suppose that among the waiting souls, one is
from time to time selected to be the offspring of such and such a
matrimonial union, so as to present (as it were) a colourable appearance
of being really the fruit of that union. Further, before birth the souls
must be steeped in the waters of Lethe, or something of the kind, so as
to rid them of all memory of their previous experiences. Such a
conception seems to {96} me to belong to the region of Mythology rather
than of sober philosophical thought. I do not deny that Mythology may
sometimes be a means of pictorially or symbolically envisaging truths to
which Philosophy vaguely points but which it cannot express in clearly
apprehensible detail. But such a Mythology as this seems to be
intellectually unmotived and unhelpful. It is not wanted to explain the
facts: there is nothing in our experience to suggest it, and much which
is _prima facie_ opposed to it. It really removes no single difficulty:
for one difficulty which it presents some appearance of removing, it
creates a dozen greater ones. It is a hypothesis which we shall do well
to dismiss as otiose.
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