Farthermore, in the two discourses of Sokrates, not merely was the process of _logical definition_ exemplified in the case of Eros--but also the process of _logical division_, in the case of Madness or Irrationality. This last extensive genus was divided first into two species--Madness, from human distemper--Madness, from divine inspiration, carrying a man out of the customary orthodoxy.[67] Next, this last species was again divided into four branches or sub-species, according to the God from whom the inspiration proceeded, and according to the character of the inspiration--the prophetic, emanating from Apollo--the ritual or mystic, from Dionysus--the poetic, from the Muses--the amatory, from Eros and Aphroditê.[68] Now both these processes, definition and division, are familiar to the true dialectician or philosopher: but they are not less essential in rhetoric also, if the process is performed with genuine art. The speaker ought to embrace in his view many particular cases, to gather together what is common to all, and to combine them into one generic concept, which is to be embodied in words as the definition. He ought also to perform the counter-process: to divide the genus not into parts arbitrary and incoherent (like a bad cook cutting up an animal without regard to the joints) but into legitimate species;[69] each founded on some positive and assignable characteristic. "It is these divisions and combinations (says Sokrates) to which I am devotedly attached, in order that I may become competent for thought and discourse: and if there be any one else whom I consider capable of thus contemplating the One and the Many as they stand in nature--I follow in the footsteps of that man as in those of a God. I call such a man, rightly or wrongly, a Dialectician."[70] [Footnote 67: Plato, Phædrus, p. 265 A. [Greek: u(po\ thei/as e)xallagê=s tô=n ei)ôtho/tôn nomi/môn.]] [Footnote 68: Plato, Phædrus, p. 265.] [Footnote 69: Plato, Phædrus, pp. 265-266. 265 D: [Greek: ei)s mi/an te i)de/an sunorô=nta a)/gein ta\ pollachê= diesparme/na, i(/n' e(/kaston o(rizo/menos dê=lon poi=ê| peri\ ou(= a)\n a)ei\ dida/skein e)the/lê|.] 265 E: [Greek: to\ pa/lin kat' ei)/dê du/nasthai te/mnein kat' a)/rthra, ê(=| pe/phuke, kai\ mê\ e)picheirei=n katagnu/nai me/ros mêde/n, kakou= magei/rou tro/pô| chrô/menon.] Seneca, Epist. 89, p. 395, ed. Gronov. "Faciam ergo quod exigis, et philosophiam in partes, non in frusta, dividam. Dividi enim illam, non concidi, utile est."] [Footnote 70: Plato, Phædrus, p. 266 B. [Greek: Tou/tôn dê\ e)/gôge au)to/s te e)rastê/s, ô)= Phai=dre, tô=n diaire/seôn kai\ sunagôgô=n, i(/n' oi(=o/s te ô)= le/gein te kai\ phronei=n; e)a/n te/ tin' a)/llon ê(gê/sômai dunato\n ei)s e(\n kai\ e)pi\ polla\ pephuko\s o(ra=|n, tou=ton diô/kô kato/pisthe met' i)/chnion ô(/ste theoi=o. kai\ me/ntoi kai\ tou\s duname/nous au)to\ dra=|n ei) me\n o)rthô=s ê)\ mê\ prosagoreu/ô, theo\s oi)=de; kalô= de\ ou)=n me/chri tou=de dialektikou/s.]]