Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 4: In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four PeriodsPlotinus
Philosophy
Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 4: In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four Periods
Plotinus
Plotinus
But why should this whole (soul-) part that is superior to sensation
be assigned to the soul rather than to intelligence? Because the power
of the soul consists in reasoning, and because all these operations
belong to the discursive reason. But why can we not simply assign to
it, in addition, self-consciousness, which would immediately clear
up this inquiry? Because the nature of discursive reason consists in
considering exterior things, and in scrutinizing their diversity, while
to intelligence we attribute the privilege of contemplating itself, and
of contemplating its own contents. But what hinders discursive reason,
by some other faculty of the soul, from considering what belongs to
it? Because, in this case, instead of discursive reason and reasoning,
we would have pure Intelligence. But what then hinders the presence
of pure Intelligence within the soul? Nothing, indeed. Shall we then
have a right to say that pure Intelligence is a part of the soul? No
indeed; but still we would have the right to call it "ours." It is
different from, and higher than discursive reason; and still it is
"ours," although we cannot count it among the parts of the soul. In one
respect it is "ours," and in another, is not "ours;" for at times we
make use of it, and at other times we make use of discursive reason;
consequently, intelligence is "ours" when we make use of it; and it
is not "ours" when we do not make use of it. But what is the meaning
of "making use of intelligence"? Does it mean becoming intelligence,
and speaking in that character, or does it mean speaking in conformity
with intelligence? For we are not intelligence; we speak in conformity
with intelligence by the first part of discursive reason, the part that
receives impressions from Intelligence. We feel through sensation, and
it is we who feel. Is it also we who conceive and who simultaneously
are conceived? Or is it we who reason, and who conceive the
intellectual notions which enlighten discursive reason? We are indeed
essentially constituted by discursive reason. The actualizations of
Intelligence are superior to us, while those of sensation are inferior;
as to us, "we" are the principal part of the soul, the part that forms
a middle power between these two extremes, now lowering ourselves
towards sensation, now rising towards Intelligence.[102] We acknowledge
sensibility to be ours because we are continually feeling. It is not
as evident that intelligence is ours, because we do not make use of it
continuously, and because it is separated, in this sense, that it is
not intelligence that inclines towards us, but rather we who raise our
glances towards intelligence. Sensation is our messenger, Intelligence
is our king.[99]
WE CAN THINK IN CONFORMITY WITH INTELLIGENCE IN TWO WAYS.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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