Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 4: In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four PeriodsPlotinus
Philosophy
Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 4: In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four Periods
Plotinus
Plotinus
6. Reason, therefore, demonstrates that there is a principle which must
essentially know itself. But this self-consciousness is more perfect in
intelligence than in the soul. The soul knows herself in so far as she
knows that she depends on another power; while intelligence, by merely
turning towards itself, naturally cognizes its existence and "being."
By contemplating realities, it contemplates itself; this contemplation
is an actualization, and this actualization is intelligence; for
intelligence and thought[107] form but a single entity. The entire
intelligence sees itself entire, instead of seeing one of its parts
by another of its parts. Is it in the nature of intelligence, such as
reason conceives of it, to produce within us a simple conviction? No.
Intelligence necessarily implies (certitude), and not mere persuasion;
for necessity is characteristic of intelligence, while persuasion is
characteristic of the soul. Here below, it is true, we rather seek to
be persuaded, than to see truth by pure Intelligence. When we were in
the superior region, satisfied with intelligence, we used to think, and
to contemplate the intelligible, reducing everything to unity. It was
Intelligence which thought and spoke about itself; the soul rested, and
allowed Intelligence free scope to act. But since we have descended
here below, we seek to produce persuasion in the soul, because we wish
to contemplate the model in its image.
THE SOUL MUST BE TAUGHT SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS BY CONVERSION.
We must, therefore, teach our soul how Intelligence contemplates
itself. This has to be taught to that part of our soul which,
because of its intellectual character, we call reason, or discursive
intelligence, to indicate that it is a kind of intelligence, that
it possesses its power by intelligence, and that it derives it from
intelligence. This part of the soul must, therefore, know that it
knows what it sees, that it knows what it expresses, and that, if it
were identical with what it describes, it would thereby know itself.
But since intelligible entities come to it from the same principle
from which it itself comes, since it is a reason, and as it receives
from intelligence entities that are kindred, by comparing them with
the traces of intelligence it contains, it must know itself. This
image it contains must, therefore, be raised to true Intelligence,
which is identical with the true intelligible entities, that is, to
the primary and really true Beings; for it is impossible that this
intelligence should originate from itself. If then intelligence remain
in itself and with itself, if it be what it is (in its nature) to be,
that is, intelligence--for intelligence can never be unintelligent--it
must contain within it the knowledge of itself, since it does not
issue from itself, and since its function and its "being" (or, true
nature) consist in being no more than intelligence.[106] It is not
an intelligence that devotes itself to practical action, obliged
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account