Popular misgovernment in the United StatesCruikshank, Alfred Byron
History
Popular misgovernment in the United States
Cruikshank, Alfred Byron
Suffrage -- United States; United States -- Politics and government
In calling to its counsels at the polls such citizens as the State may
deem competent for that purpose, it is practically impossible to select
individuals; but it is quite possible to designate certain classes to
whom suffrage may or may not be permitted; and when these classes are
open to receive accessions indefinitely upon conditions useful to the
State and attainable by all, there is nothing in the whole transaction
inimical to the best democracy, or of which complaint can be made on the
ground of monopoly or injustice. The acquisition and judicious
management of a reasonable amount of property are terms and conditions
of just this character and experience has amply shown the necessity for
their imposition in the interests of society.
To summarize this branch of the subject. The primary object of an ideal
election is not to ascertain where lies the interest or to gratify the
caprices or whims of individuals, but to continue and sustain, and if
necessary to create the government of the country. The exercise of this
function is in itself an act of government or in aid of government, and
the privilege of participation therein is an acquired, a conferred
authority or function, not a natural right, and should be bestowed
solely for merit or capacity to be exercised in trust for the common
benefit. It is the patriotic duty of all incapable, unprepared or
unqualified citizens voluntarily to refrain from taking part in this
function; and it is the right and duty of the State by appropriate
legislation to exclude peremptorily therefrom all classes of men
incapable of its proper exercise, and for this purpose to establish
racial, property, educational, or other appropriate qualifications.
On the theory that the State itself may be supposed to have been
originally inaugurated and its operations originally sanctioned by the
suffrages of all its citizens as their creature and agent, a curious
question has been raised by some writers, namely, on what ground the
State can exclude from the constituent franchise a part, though ever so
small, of its original creators or principals. Such writers have,
however, overlooked the existence of a power higher and mightier than
that of the State or of its inhabitants at any particular period; a
power which is the real source of the authority of the State. This power
is “Society,” and its relation to the subject of the franchise will be
dealt with in the next chapter.
CHAPTER IV
THE STATE AS THE DEPUTY OF SOCIETY POSSESSES THE JUST POWER OF ORDAINING
FRANCHISE QUALIFICATIONS
_Yes, for it was not Zeus who gave them forth,_
_Nor Justice, dwelling with the gods below,_
_Who traced these laws for all the sons of men;_
_The unwritten laws of God that know no change,_
_They are not of today nor yesterday,_
_But live forever, nor can man assign,_
_When first they sprang to being._
(SOPHOCLES: “Antigone”)
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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