"Dewey's and Sampson's victories must be very depressing to French, German and Russian naval aspirations," observes a gentleman of Washington, who is a most competent authority. "For years they have been measuring up against England, and quietly calculating what combinations they could make to overthrow British sea power. France, particularly, has been building a navy which she hoped, in spite of past experience, might cope with England's. She has spent immense sums upon it, and relative to the interests it has to guard, it is larger and stronger than England's. But Spain's experience reiterates the old story that it is not so much the ships as the men on them who win victories. Had the Americans been on Spanish ships and the Spanish on the American there would have been a very different story to tell. While the French are very superior to the Spanish, they are of the same Latin blood, and there is just enough similiarity between the two peoples to hint at the success French ships would have in encountering with Anglo-Saxons, either sailing under the Star Spangled Banner or the Cross of St. George. Germany is likely to have the same sort of a chill. The Gentians have never been a maritime nation. A German war vessel has never fired a hostile shot, and Germans may well have solicitous thoughts as to the result of a struggle with men who have shown themselves past masters in the art of naval warfare. Russia is in the same situation. She has never actually fought anybody at sea but the Turks. The wiser among these peoples are very likely to begin thinking that their dreams of sea power are vain illusions, and that they had better save the money they have been spending on navies and resign the dominion of the sea to the English-speaking races." There is no doubt that our naval victories have taught many and valuable lessons, and it is perhaps proper to make a slight digression here and show what some of these lessons are. Let us then consider the deliberations of a board of naval officers, some of the ablest experts in the service, appointed by Admiral Sampson, after the battle of Santiago de Cuba, to report upon the condition of Cervera's sunken fleet, the extent of damages done by American shells and the lessons to be learned therefrom to guide the United States in its future ship construction. The conclusions reached by the board were as follows: The use of wood in the construction and equipment of war ships should be reduced to the utmost minimum possible. Loaded torpedoes above the water line are a serious menace to the vessels carrying them, and they should not be so carried by vessels other than torpedo boats. The value of rapid-fire batteries cannot be too highly estimated. All water and steam pipes should be laid beneath the protective deck and below the water line and fitted with risers at such points as may be considered necessary.