character of certain portions of the writings of the Old Testament or of the Koran prove the matter of their literal and factual truth in the ordinary sense of these terms. As Hume said, “When any opinion leads us into absurdities ’tis certainly false, but ’tis not certain that an opinion is false because it has dangerous consequences.” And then, apart from this conspicuous absence of logic in the views of pragmatists upon “truth,” the expression of their doctrine is so confusing that it is almost impossible to extract any consistent meaning out of it. They are continually confounding conceptions and ideas and propositions, forgetful of the fact that truth resides not in concepts and ideas but only in propositions. While it may be indeed true, as against Rationalism, that all human conceptions whatsoever [and it is only in connexion with “conceptions” that Pragmatism is defined even in such an official place as Baldwin’s _Dictionary of Philosophy_[238]] have, and must have, reference to actual or possible human experience or consequences, it is by no means true that the test of a proposition is anything other than the evidence of which we have already spoken. Then the pragmatists have never adequately defined terms that are so essential to their purposes as “practical,” “truth,” “fact,” “reality,” “consequences,” and they confound, too, “theories” with “truths” and “concepts” just as they confound concepts and propositions. (2) That logic and the theory of proof is thus one of the weak spots of Pragmatism has perhaps then been sufficiently indicated. We have seen, in fact, the readiness of Pragmatism to confess its inability[239] to prove its own philosophy--that is, to prove it in the ordinary sense of the term.[240] That it should have made this confession is, of course, only in keeping with the fact that its interest in logic is confined to such subordinate topics as the framing and verification of hypotheses, the development of concepts and judgments in the “thought-process,” and so on. Of complete proof, as involving both deduction and induction, it takes but the scantiest recognition. And it has made almost no effort to connect its discoveries in “genetic logic” and in the theory of hypotheses with the traditional body of logical doctrine.[241] Nor, as may perhaps be inferred from the preceding paragraph, has it made any serious attempt to consider the question of the discovery of new truth in relation to the more or less perfectly formulated systems and schemes of truth already in the possession of mankind.