In connection with privateering there can be no doubt but that the generous giving of prizes has enabled England to make effective war with little national expense. Elizabeth's wars cost her nothing, rather they were a source of income. The same was true of the wars of the eighteenth century. The hope of gain seemed always sufficient to enlist private enterprise in privateering war. However privateering is now abolished. Modern naval strategy demands a few men-of-war rather than many cruisers. Captain Mahan[2] considers commercial war as of comparatively small importance. An effective blow can only be struck by conflict with the enemy's armed vessels. Any amount of commerce destroying can not conclude the war in his opinion, though he by no means takes the stand that commerce destroying should be abolished. It would seem that the small share of prize which might possibly be received by a sailor in a modern ship would be a negligible factor in increasing naval efficiency. Rather it would be a deterrent as it would attract vessels into commercial war instead of into the more effective conflicts with the enemy's armed vessels. With the abolition of privateering it would seem that the value of prize money as a means of increasing the efficiency of the navy departed. b. International Law. England's prize money laws can not be said to have imperiled neutral rights. England has always insisted on the most extreme belligerent rights but it can not be said that her courts often denied a neutral right that was really established by international law. The prize courts of Mansfield and Stowell have been considered models of fairness throughout the world. Though the utmost privileges were given to privateers and the sailors of the royal navy the even handed justice of the prize courts fully protected neutral rights by restoring illegal captures made with the hope of private gain. With a people of less law abiding disposition and less used to submission to law than the English this might not be true.