Clearly, this notion also will not do; but while we may reject Mill's theory as to the _nature_ of the limitations of Divine power, there {94} is distinct force in his shrewd contention that religious people generally--professions to the contrary notwithstanding--have never really believed God to be, in the strict sense of the term, omnipotent. This contention we believe, indeed, to be almost self-evidently true; for on the contrary supposition nothing can happen contrary to God's will--all things and beings would necessarily be carrying out that will, and sin, _e.g._, would become an utterly meaningless term. But if omnipotence is limited--which sounds, we admit, a contradiction in terms--we ask once more, In what way and by whom? To that question we have no other reply than the one given in our first chapter, _viz._, that when we predicate limitation of the Deity, we must mean self-limitation. In creating the universe, we said, God made a distinction between His creation and Himself, and to that extent limited His Being--for the universe is not identical with God; we now add that in endowing man with an existence related to, but distinct from, His own, He limited not only His infinite Being, but also His infinite Power, delegating some portion thereof to us--for man's will is not identical with God's will, but capable of resisting, though also capable of co-operating with it. Without such individual initiative, without such an individual faculty of choosing between alternatives of action, man could never have been a moral agent; but moral liberty to choose and act aright or amiss implies also {95} moral responsibility for such choice on the part of the chooser.