There are reasons which appeal to me very strongly why the British principle should be accepted, but I am not clear that I shall be of that opinion in the end. One of these reasons is: This compensation, if it is given under a compensation act, will be for the purpose of trying to see that all persons who are injured in the course of carrying on an industry are taken care of. It has a public purpose; namely, to prevent the piling up of the burden upon public and private charity, the very things we saw set forth in the chart that Mr. Kingsley exhibited a few minutes ago. Is there any reason why, when we have tried to make that provision for the inevitable result of industry, we should refuse to punish those rare cases of misconduct which mean that men have grossly trifled with the safety of their employes? I am not quite clear that there is any good reason. I am confident that an examination of the British decisions, since they put the first compensation act upon the statute books in 1907, would show that there have been very few cases, indeed, in which the employers have been held liable, where they ought not to have been actually punished for misconduct. There is one consideration, however, that does not appeal to me which has been brought forward in the argument here, and I wish to speak about it. It is that by reason of such punishment employers will be more careful. I am sorry to say that such does not appear to be true. All the evidence to the present time is that employers are most careless where there is nothing for which they are held responsible but negligence. They are enormously more careful when they are held for every accident that happens. Experience all over the world has shown this to be true, and I want to add one thing that is almost more important still; they are still more careful in countries where they are not even held individually responsible, but are only held responsible for the payment of insurance premiums. The greatest amount of prevention and the largest amount of care exercised by employers anywhere in the world is in those countries which have compulsory or obligatory insurance laws. The reason is very simple: nearly every employer does not think that a catastrophe, due to his negligence, will ever happen. But when you hold him under a compensation act for every accident, big or little, negligent or not, and accidents are happening every day, and there is a good deal of money being paid more or less continually, he will be much more careful. Again, when you introduce a compulsory insurance system, if his institution is not up to standard, he finds he is paying three times as big a rate of premium, perhaps, as another employer in the same business, and he does not wait for accidents to happen, but takes measures at once to prevent them, and so get a present and permanent benefit in a reduction of his rate. There has nothing been found yet which will cause so effective prevention of accidents as