Prolegomena to the Study of Hegel's Philosophy, and Especially of His LogicWallace, William
Philosophy
Prolegomena to the Study of Hegel's Philosophy, and Especially of His Logic
Wallace, William
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 1770-1831; Logic
When they insisted upon a severance of the elements in the
vulgarly-accepted unities of the world, Science and Freethinking, like
Epicurus in an older day, have believed that they were liberating the
world from its various superstitions, from the bonds which instinct
and custom had fastened upon things so as to combine them into systems
more or less arbitrary. They denied the supremacy and reality of those
ideas which insist on the essential unity and self-sameness in things
that visibly and tangibly have a separate existence of their own, and
branded these ideas comprehensively as mysticism and metaphysics.
They sought to disabuse us of spirits, vital forces, divine right of
governments, final causes, _et hoc genus omne._ They were exceedingly
jealous for the independence of the individual, and for his right to
demand satisfaction for the questioning, ground-seeking faculty of
his nature. But while they did so they hardly realised how entirely
the spectator is the part, the product of what he surveys, and while
surveying treats as if it were but a spot or mark on the circumference
of the circle that lies--some way off--around him. 'Phenomenalism,' as
this mode of looking at things has been called, is false to life, and
would cut away the ground from philosophy.[4]
To some extent philosophy returns to the position of the wider
consciousness, to the general belief in harmony and symmetry. It
reverts to the unity or connexion, which the natural presumptions of
mankind find in the picture of the world. The _nolo philosophari_
of the intuitivist, in reaction from the supposed excesses of the
sciences, simply reverted to the bare re-statement of the popular
creed. If science, e. g., had shown that the perception of an
external world pre-supposed for its accomplishment an unsuspected
series of intermediate steps, the mere intuitivist simply denied
the intermediation by appealing to Common Sense, or to the natural
instincts and primary beliefs of mankind. Conviction and natural
instinct were declared to counterbalance the abstractions of science.
But philosophy which seeks to comprehend existence cannot take the
same ground as the intuitional school, or neglect the testimony of
science. If the spiritual unity of the world has been denied and lost
to sight, mere assertion that we feel and own its pervading power will
not do much good. It is necessary to reconcile the contrast between
the wholeness of the natural vision, and the fragmentary, but in its
fragments elaborated, result of science.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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