The former are numerous; the latter ought to be; and the service is one the nation may well expect of them. Why should not there be innumerable Lord Rosses, Sir Francis Crossleys, Sir David Baxters, and Sir William Browns, promoting beneficent commerce by their generosity; and why should not manufacturers systematically combine as an association to procure through science and experiment every possible improvement? “Or the State must put a value on the service rendered by an inventor, and make him a pecuniary reward.” And why should we not prefer this alternative? “This has been done in some instances, and may be done without inconvenience in cases of very conspicuous public benefit.” Well: that is a great deal; but why not in cases that are not conspicuous? “But in general an exclusive privilege of temporary duration is preferable—” Now, mark the only reasons adduced:— “because it leaves nothing to any one’s discretion—” That is, I suppose, Mr. Mill, to avoid trusting anybody—the danger from doing which is imaginary, or at least avoidable—would let the nation remain subject to proved frightful inconvenience and loss. “and the greater the usefulness, the greater the reward—” Which, Mr. Mill rightly thinks, is what ought to be, but it is not and cannot be what happens under Patents; for, on the contrary, rewards depend mainly on the extent of use and the facility of levying royalties. “and because it is paid by the very persons to whom the service is rendered, the consumers of the commodity.” Here Mr. Mill appears to regard, and it is right he should, manufacturers as mere intermediates. Well: can they shift the burden which they, in the first instance exclusively bear, from their own shoulders to those of the consumer? Perhaps they could have done so before the inauguration of Free Trade; but since that time, the thing is impossible, and so will it ever be until the day arrive when either Patents shall apply to all countries, and in all countries exactly the same royalties shall be charged for their use, or else they are abolished. “So decisive, indeed, are these considerations, that if the system of Patents were abandoned for that of rewards by the State, the best shape which these could assume would be that of a small temporary tax imposed for the inventor’s benefit—” Would he in general get it? And, let me ask, how collected—how distributed? “on all persons making use of the invention.” A thing impossible, however, even for conspicuous inventions; and to which there is the further fatal objection that there must be none but such recognised, which might be unfairness, as it certainly would be partiality. If, as indicated, a tax on all users and consumers, will not grants from the Exchequer be in the main fair enough as to incidence? “To this, however, or to any other system which would vest in the State—” Why the State? Why not let inventors decide?