When Lord Mayo entered on his Viceroyalty, three Asiatic States were in disorder beyond the North-Western Frontier, and two great Powers were stealthily but steadily advancing towards India through those disordered States. On the Punjab Frontier, Afghanistan had just emerged from six years of anarchy; and Russia was casting hungry eyes on Afghanistan as a line of approach to India. On the Sind Frontier, Baluchistan was the scene of a chronic struggle between the ruling power and the tribal Chiefs; while Persia was taking advantage of that struggle to encroach upon the Western Provinces of Baluchistan. In the far north, beyond Kashmir, the new Muhammadan State of Eastern Turkestan had erected itself on a ruined fragment of the Chinese Empire, and was looking eagerly out for recognition on the one side to Russia, and on the other side to the British Government of India. Lord Mayo's foreign policy was therefore of necessity a Central Asian policy. Its immediate object was {120} to create out of the disordered territories of Afghanistan and Baluchistan two friendly powers, who should have not only the desire to be our friends, but also the strength which might make their friendship worth having. Its ulterior design was, by thus erecting a breakwater of faithful States around the North-Western Frontier of India, to counterbalance the ominous preponderance which Russia had lately acquired in Central Asia. Its result has been, as I mentioned in my opening chapter, to supply the necessary complement to the change inaugurated by Dalhousie; and to remove the relations of Russia and England in the East from the arena of Asiatic intrigue to the jurisdiction of European diplomacy. During the seven years preceding Lord Mayo's arrival, the British policy towards Afghanistan had been subjected to an increasing strain, and a few months before his arrival that policy had manifestly broken down. Our relations with Afghanistan continued nominally on the basis laid down by Mr. [afterwards Lord] Lawrence and Major Lumsden in 1858. Its cardinal principle was, in Major Lumsden's words, 'to have as little to say to Afghanistan as possible, beyond maintaining friendly and intimate intercourse with the _de facto_ Government.' But in 1863, on the death of the powerful Afghan ruler, Dost Muhammad, the _de facto_ Government of Afghanistan disappeared. A war of succession followed among the sons and nephews of the late Amir. Sher Ali, the rightful successor, was for a time driven out {121} of the field by his brother Afzul Khan, in 1866. Instead, therefore, of a single _de facto_ Government in Afghanistan--such as existed in 1858--there were at least two Rulers, each of whom claimed to be the Sovereign Power.