Sextus Empiricus and Greek ScepticismPatrick, Mary Mills
Philosophy
Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism
Patrick, Mary Mills
Sextus Empiricus; Skepticism
[1]The problem of philosophy is here proposed very nearly in the
terms of Kant, but not with the positive motive, like that of
the great philosopher of Germany, of evolving a system to
present the truth. Yet the importance of these questions shows
the originality of Pyrrho. The earnestness of Pyrrho is further
shown by an example given by Diogenes. Once on being found
talking to himself alone, he said, when asked the reason, that
he was meditating how to become a good man ([Greek:
chrestos]),[2] thus showing an entirely different spirit from
anything found in Sextus' books. The explanation of his life and
teachings is to be found largely in his own disposition. Such an
attitude of indifference must belong to a placid nature, and
cannot be entirely the result of a philosophical system, and,
while it can be aimed at, it can never be perfectly imitated.
One of his disciples recognised this, and said that it was
necessary to have the disposition of Pyrrho in order to hold his
doctrines.[3] Diogenes tells us that he was the first to advance
any formulae of Scepticism,[4] but they must have been very
elementary, as Pyrrho himself wrote nothing. We find no trace of
formulated Tropes in Pyrrho's teachings, yet it is probable that
he indicated some of the contradictions in sensation, and
possibly the Tropes in some rudimentary form. Of the large
number of sceptical formulae, or [Greek: phonai], the three
which seem to have the oldest connection with Scepticism are the
[Greek: antilogia], the [Greek: ouden horizo], and the [Greek:
ou mallon].[5] We know from Diogenes that Protagoras is the
authority for saying that in regard to everything there are two
opposing arguments.[6] The saying "to determine nothing" is
quoted from Timon's _Python_ by Diogenes,[7] and the other two
mentioned are also attributed to him by Aristocles.[8] We have
also in the [Greek: ou mallon] a direct connection with
Democritus, although the difference in the meaning which he
attributed to it is shown by Sextus.[9] So while the expression
is the same, the explanation of it given by Pyrrho must have
been different. It would seem probable that Pyrrho used all of
these three sayings, from the account of Diogenes, and that even
then they gave rise to the accusation of the Dogmatics, that
simply by possessing such sayings the Sceptics dogmatised,[10]
for the refutation of this used by Sextus occurs in the old
account of the sayings, namely, that these formulae include also
themselves in the meaning, as a cathartic removes itself
together with other harmful objects.[11]
[1] Compare Maccoll _Op. cit._ p. 21.
[2] Diog. IX. 11, 64.
[3] Diog. IX. 11, 70, 64.
[4] Diog. IX. 11, 69; IX. 11, 61.
[5] _Hyp._ I. 202; Diog. IX. 8, 51; _Photius_ Bekker's ed.
280 H.
[6] _Photius_ Bekker's ed. 280 H.
[7] _Hyp._ I. 197; Diog. IX. 11, 76.
[8] _Aristocles ap. Eusebium, Praep. Ev._ XIV. 18.
[9] _Hyp._ I. 213.
[10] Diog. IX. 11, 68-76.
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