‘_January 21st._--Severe fighting going on. The English have got
on to the ridge, and have put up schanzes all along it, and at
some points are only eight hundred to nine hundred yards from our
trenches. Our men are beginning to get very jumpy and nervous,
as their trenches are lying mostly in open rolling country, and,
according to many of the Burghers, could be rushed. There has been
continuous rifle fire from the various schanzes and trenches all
day. Two Ermelo men have been killed and five wounded. Total Boer
casualties up there, so far, are sixty. The English artillery
is magnificent, so much so that our guns can only be worked at
intervals.
‘_January 22nd._--All eyes are now directed to the Upper Tugela,
and there is no doubt affairs there are becoming critical. The
strain of the continuous fighting is beginning to tell on the
Burghers, more especially as there are every day more or less
casualties in the trenches. The Burghers get into the trenches
before daylight, and then have to remain in them till they are
relieved the next morning before daybreak. The country is too open
and exposed for them to leave the trenches, unless it is dark.
Moreover, they are expecting a rush some morning early, or a night
attack.
‘_January 23rd._--Excitement everywhere is intense, and if things
continue like this for a few days longer, the Boers will break
and run. Things are hanging in the balance, and the officers and
burghers are looking more anxious now than when retreating through
Weenen. The English have only to win through our trenches to the
Ladysmith-Van Reenen road, i.e. about one mile of open rolling
country, and then Ladysmith is practically relieved.
‘Owing to the Boer trenches not being “cast-iron” positions, and
chiefly because they have no good back door to them, the Boers do
not like them, and I verily believe the English are going to break
through at last. The wear and tear and strain of the last two days’
fighting is telling very much on the burghers.’
Here we have evidence that Sir Charles Warren’s plan of advancing
step by step after periods of continuous bombardment was demoralising
the Boers, and that another day or two of such bombardment would
have enabled the British to rush the Boer trenches with success.
A writer of a paper entitled ‘Pages from the Diary of a Boer
Officer,’ by another of them, contributed to the ‘United Service
Magazine’ of February 1902, says, in reference to the importance of
Spion Kop:
‘The centre and key of the line of defence was Spion Kop, a
flat-topped hill, which through its height dominated all the
federal positions.... Besides being the central position this
hill was the key of the federal line of defence and thus most
important--the taking and the holding of Spion Kop by the English
meaning the defeat of the Republicans and the relief of Ladysmith.’
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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