Social Rights And Duties: Addresses to Ethical Societies. Vol 1 [of 2]Stephen, Leslie
Philosophy
Social Rights And Duties: Addresses to Ethical Societies. Vol 1 [of 2]
Stephen, Leslie
Ethics, Evolutionary; Social ethics
stated, but that the attempt must be illusory because the conclusions
are not determinable from the premisses. The economic laws do not follow
from any simple rule about human desires, because they vary according to
the varying constitution of human society; and any conclusion which you
could obtain would be necessarily confined to the abstract man of whom
the law is supposed to hold good. Every such method, therefore, if it
could be successful, could only lead to conclusions about human desire
in general, and could throw no light upon the special problems of
political economy, which essentially depend upon varying industrial
organisation.
I will not, however, go further. You must either, I hold, limit
Political Economy to the field of statistical inquiry, or admit that,
as a part of sociology, it deals with questions altogether beyond the
reach of mathematics. Like physiology, it is concerned with results
capable of numerical statement. The number of beats of the pulse, or
the number of degrees of temperature of the body, are important data in
physiological problems. They may be counted, and may give rise to
mathematically expressible formulæ. But the fact does not excuse us
from considering the physical conditions of the organs which are in
some way correlated with these observed phenomena; and, in the case of
Political Economy, we have to do with the social structure, which is
dependent upon forces altogether incapable of precise numerical
estimates. That, at least, is my view; and I shall apply it to
illustrate one remark, which must, I think, have often occurred to us.
Political Economy, that is, often appears to have a negative rather
than a positive value. It is exceedingly potent--so, at least, I
think--in dispersing certain popular fallacies; but it fails when we
regard it as a science which can give us positive concrete "laws". The
general reason is, I should say, that although its first principles may
be true descriptions of facts, and any denial of them, or any
inconsistent applications of them, may lead us into error, they are yet
far from sufficient descriptions. They omit some considerations which
are relevant in any concrete case; and the facts which they describe
are so complex that, even when we look at them consistently and follow
the right clue, we cannot solve the complicated problems which occur.
It may be worth while to insist a little upon this, and to apply it to
one or two peculiar problems.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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