This enormous development of the _minette_ district was quite unforeseen in 1871, yet we know that even then the Germans were not blind to the importance of its iron. The iron deposits of the region were carefully studied by German geologists for their government, with the result that the German territorial demands were shaped with the purpose of including the best of them and were further increased between the preliminaries of Versailles and the final treaty of Frankfort. Hence the meanderings of the frontier then drawn. It was believed that the main vein had been secured, comprising the ores near the surface which alone appeared workable with profit, and that nothing valuable in the deposit had been omitted. Only later was it discovered that the dip of the strata toward Briey and Longwy concealed an even richer field on the French side which could be worked to a considerable depth. Moreover the German geologists of 1871 were especially interested in the phosphorus-free ore and could not foresee the value which the Thomas process would give the _minette_. Lamentations over their shortsightedness were heard before the war,[26] and in August 1914 German engineers hastened to occupy Briey and Longwy, whose ores are valued not only for their content but for mixing with the less calcareous German ores. It was frequently declared in Germany that without this occupied territory the production of German munitions would have to cease, although this is hardly justified by the facts now available concerning the actual use which was made of _minette_ ore for this purpose. Moreover, it is well to remember that readjustments of the Lorraine frontier at the expense of France were a constant objective of the Germans throughout the war. At times these were sketched broadly as part of a general advance of the German boundary along the whole front from Belfort to the mouth of the Somme, but more frequently they are described as “improvements” of the frontier in Lorraine, with the _minette_ area of French Lorraine and the great border fortresses as the definite objectives. The acquisition of Briey and Longwy figured in all the principal programs of annexation, especially those of the great economic interests, which went so far as to declare that a war which did not secure them for Germany would be a failure. The object was clearly economic, or rather, in view of the place of iron and steel in modern warfare, military-economic.