Sound Mind: Or, Contributions to the natural history and physiology of the human intellectHaslam, John
Science
Sound Mind: Or, Contributions to the natural history and physiology of the human intellect
Haslam, John
Intellect; Mental health
It is perhaps impossible, in a few words, to describe precisely the
nature of the operation termed reasoning. In general terms it may be
defined, _the means we employ for the attainment of the end proposed;
the employment of knowledge for the discovery of truth_; or _the process
of demonstration_; whether the object be an arithmetical sum, a
geometrical problem, or a discourse on taste. A part of the process of
reasoning, according to received opinion, consists in comparison, either
of things, or of general terms; and this comparison implies not merely
their exterior similitude, but likewise their internal structure and
composition: because two mineral substances may resemble each other in
external appearance, and may wholly differ in their intrinsic
properties. The process of ascertaining wherein they agree, and the
circumstances which discriminate them, is an instance of reasoning, or
the means we employ for the proposed end, and which means necessarily
imply the previous possession of knowledge. It will also be seen that in
the instance adduced, and indeed in most others, where we reason on
things, that precision can only be attained through the medium of
number; for these mineral substances, although similar in external
character, may contain very different proportions of the precious
metals, and their actual value can only be estimated by comparison; that
is, by an analysis, founded in knowledge, to ascertain the per centage
of gold or silver, which must be expressed in numbers: and the
comparison that is instituted concerning general or abstract terms,
must have for its basis the establishment of their legitimate force and
meaning.
When we consult authorities on this subject, and particularly Dr.
Johnson's dictionary, we find that he has given eleven different
significations of the term _reason_, which he defines to be "the power
by which man _deduces_ one proposition from another, or proceeds from
premises to consequences." There is, however, much ambiguity in this
statement; and it would perhaps be impossible, in reasoning concerning
things, (which is to be considered as the most perfect example of this
process,) to adduce an instance, in which one proposition is strictly
_deduced_ from another.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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