Submarine Warfare, Past, Present, and FutureFyfe, Herbert C.
History
Submarine Warfare, Past, Present, and Future
Fyfe, Herbert C.
Submarine warfare
There have been those who have declared that those who handle such
weapons will be far more subject to moral and indeed physical effect
than those against whom they are directed, and though this may be true
of certain navies it is certainly not true of the British.
It would be possible to quote many instances, both of cases in which
submarine defences have prevented the carrying out of certain operations
and also of other cases where they have been disregarded. Just as there
have been audacious burglaries in spite of “Beware of the dog” notices,
so there have been daring attacks in spite of known submarine defences.
There is always in warfare the possibility that the mine may fail to act
at the critical moment, that the torpedo may not succeed in firing its
mark and that the submarine boat may miss its prey.
The first occasion on which the moral influence of modern under-water
methods of warfare made itself felt was during the American Civil War.
The story of Admiral Farragut’s entrance into Mobile Bay, on August 5,
1864, is a well-known instance of a commander advancing in spite of
known dangers beneath the waves. It has been admirably told in the life
of the Admiral by Captain A. T. Mahan. The channel was known to be sown
with mines and one of his ships, the _Tecumseh_, had been sent to the
bottom already by one of these unseen weapons. The Admiral reasoned
thus: “The chances are that I shall lose some of my vessels by torpedoes
or the guns of the enemy, but with some of my fleet afloat I shall
eventually be successful. I cannot lose all. I will attack regardless of
consequences and never turn back.” As the _Hartford_ passed the
_Brooklyn_ a warning cry came from the latter that there were torpedoes
ahead.
“Damn the torpedoes!” shouted the Admiral in the exaltation of his high
purpose. “Four bells! Captain Drayton, go ahead. Jouett, full speed!”
The _Hartford_ and her consort crossed the line about 500 yards from
Mobile Point, well to the westward of the buoy and of the spot where the
_Tecumseh_ had gone down. As they passed between the buoys the cases of
the torpedoes were heard by many on board knocking against the copper of
the bottom, and many of the primers snapped audibly, but no torpedo
exploded.
The _Hartford_ went safely through, the gates of Mobile Bay were forced,
and as Farragut’s flag cleared the obstructions his last and hardest
battle was virtually won.
Mines had been plentifully sown by the Confederates, and across the deep
water 180 had been placed in a double line. The most effective were
those made of lager beer kegs coated with pitch and fitted with a number
of sensitive primers; the others had tin or iron covers, but they
corroded in the water and quickly became harmless. In addition, there
were three electro-contact mines which were to be exploded from Fort
Morgan. Had the mines been in an efficient state Admiral Farragut and
his fleet would assuredly have gone to the bottom. He took the risk—and
won.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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