The column[63] was proposed as a battle formation in France as early as 1774 by Mesnil Durand, but did not find practical application until the wars of the Revolution. In those wars columns were used because the raw levies lacked the training necessary for making movements in line. Whenever a line formation was used, battalions, owing to the scarcity of efficient officers, resolved themselves into disorderly skirmish lines which were exceedingly difficult to control. The adoption of the column was, therefore, the result of practical experience, but as a formation it could be justified on the battlefield only so long as it remained capable of development for the purpose of firing. The endeavor to combine the advantages of column and line by a combination of both formations led to the placing of columns in rear of the wings of the battalions deployed in line. This formation was employed for the first time in the attack made by a demi-brigade during the battle on the =Tagliamento= (1797), and subsequently it was used at =Marengo= (attack made by Desaix’s Division). [63] The development of the French column tactics is splendidly portrayed by KUHL in his work _Bonapartes erster Feldzug, 1796_, p. 46, et seq. [Illustration] During the first decade of the 19th Century the French leaders had a marked _penchant_ for this formation, until it sank more and more into insignificance in face of the deep column. (Ney at =Waterloo=, and Macdonald at =Wagram=). Formations suggesting the above are found even in the Prussian regulations of 1876. (Posting of sharpshooter platoons of the companies at first in rear of the wings of the deployed battalion, and later in rear of the outer flank platoons of the companies). [Illustration] On account of the increased penetrating power of infantry projectiles, especially at short ranges, a column will suffer greater losses than a line; at longer ranges the curvature of the trajectory causes bullets which pass over the first echelon to strike the second or third. On ground falling with respect to the line of sight, lines, and on ground rising with respect to the line of sight, columns are exposed to greater losses when they come within the beaten zone.[64] [64] At 1000 m., the projectile of rifle model ’98 falls 5 cm. for each meter of the range, and at 1200 m. it falls 6 cm. per meter of the range, so that the second and third platoons of a company in column of platoons (7.2 m. distance between platoons) would offer a target having a vulnerable surface 35 cm. high (¹⁄₅ the height of a man), at 1000 m., 42 cm. high (¹⁄₄ the height of a man) at 1200 m. 3. THE COMPANY. (a) Formation of the Company. (Par. 83 German I. D. R.).