“I hate that woman,” said a gentleman, looking at one who had been his nurse; “I hate that woman, for she changed me at nurse.” Lord Orford particularly admires this bull, because in the confusion of the blunderer’s ideas he is not clear even of his personal identity. Philosophers will not perhaps be so ready as his lordship has been to call this a blunder of the first magnitude. Those who have never been initiated into the mysteries of metaphysics may have the presumptuous ignorance to fancy that they understand what is meant by the common words _I_, or _me_; but the able metaphysician knows better than Lord Orford’s changeling how to prove, to our satisfaction, that we know nothing of the matter. “Personal identity,” says Locke, “consists not in the identity of substance, but in the identity of consciousness, wherein Socrates and the present mayor of Queenborough agree they are the same person: if the same Socrates, sleeping and waking, do not partake of the same consciousness, Socrates waking and sleeping is not the same person; and to punish Socrates waking for what sleeping Socrates thought, and waking Socrates was never conscious of, would be no more of right than to punish one twin for what his brother twin did, whereof he knew nothing, because their outsides are so like that they could not be distinguished; for such twins have been seen.” [28] We may presume that our Hibernian’s consciousness could not retrograde to the time when he was changed at nurse; consequently there was no continuity of identity between the infant and the man who expressed his hatred of the nurse for perpetrating the fraud. At all events, the confusion of identity which excited Lord Orford’s admiration in our Hibernian is by no means unprecedented in France, England, or ancient Greece, and consequently it cannot be an instance of national idiosyncracy, or an Irish bull. We find a similar blunder in Spain, in the time of Cervantes:-- “Pray tell me, squire,” says the duchess, in Don Quixote, “is not your master the person whose history is printed under the name of the sage Hidalgo Don Quixote de la Mancha, who professes himself the admirer of one Dulcinea del Toboso?” “The very same, my lady,” answered Sancho; “and I myself am that very squire of his, who is mentioned, or ought to be mentioned, in that history, _unless they have changed me in the cradle_.” In Molière’s Amphitrion there is a dialogue between Mercure and Sosie, evidently taken from the _Attic_ Lucian. Sosie being completely puzzled out of his personal identity, if not out of his senses, says literally, “of my being myself I begin to doubt in good earnest; yet when I feel myself, and when I recollect myself, it seems to me that _I am I_.” [29]