The facts thus far brought into view are these: That in a considerable number of persons there may be developed, either spontaneously or artificially, a second personality different in character and distinct in its consciousness and memories from the primary or original self; that this second personality is not a mere change of consciousness, but in some sense it is a different entity, having a power of observation, attention and memory not only when the primary self is submerged and without consciousness or volition, but also at the same time that the primary self is in action, performing its usual offices, and in its turn it is equally capable of managing the affairs and performing the offices properly pertaining to the common body whenever needed for that purpose. Reckoning these different personalities as No. 1, No. 2, No. 3, etc., No. 1 has no knowledge of No. 2, nor of any succeeding personality, nor of their acts, but the time occupied by them is to No. 1 a blank, during which it is without volition, memory, or consciousness. No. 2 has a distinct consciousness and chain of memories of its own, but it also knows more or less perfectly the history and acts of No. 1--it knows this history, however, only as pertaining to a third person; it knows nothing of No. 3, nor of any personality subsequently coming into activity. No. 3 has also its distinct personality, and knows both No. 1 and No. 2, but knows them only as separate and distinct personalities; it does not know any personality coming into activity after itself. So distinct are these personalities that No. 2 not only may not possess the acquirements, as, for instance, the book knowledge, trade, or occupation of No. 1, but may possess other capabilities and acquirements entirely foreign to No. 1, and of which it possessed no knowledge. Ansel Bourne was a farmer and preacher, and knew nothing of storekeeping. A. J. Brown, the second personality, was a business man, neither farmer nor preacher. Louis V., as No. 2, was a tailor, and a very good boy; as No. 3, he was a private of marines, and knew nothing of tailoring, and he was a moral monster; while, in what might be called his No. 5 condition, he was again an undeveloped child, as he was before his fright. Still another fact which comes prominently into view in examining these cases is that the No. 2 personality may not, by any means, be inferior to the No. 1, or original self. In none of the cases cited has the intellectual capacity of the later developed personality been inferior to that of the original self, and generally it was notably superior; only in the No. 3 personality of Louis V. was the moral state worse than in No. 1, and, in general, the moral standing of No. 2 or No. 3 was fully equal to the primary self.