If all made up their minds with proper care and candor, there would be no need of this chapter. But some do not try to understand what they condemn; and our mode of argument is open to objections, especially in the minds of those who judge without thinking. The chief objections will therefore be considered. They are these:--it does not solve difficulties in revelation to say that there are as great in natural religion:--it will not make men religious to show them that it is _as_ important as worldly prudence, for showing that, does not make them prudent:--the justice of God in the system of religion, is not proved by showing it is as apparent as in his natural providence:--no reasoning from analogy can carry full conviction:--mankind will not renounce present pleasures, for a religion which is not free from doubt. To each of which a reply will now be given. I. _As to requiring a solution of all difficulties._ =1.= This is but resolving to comprehend the nature of God, and the whole plan of his government throughout eternity. =2.= It is always right to argue from what is known, to what is disputed. We are constantly so doing. The most eminent physician does not understand all diseases, yet we do not despise what he does know. =3.= It is very important to find that objections against revelation are just as strong, not only against natural religion, but against the course of nature. II. _As to men’s having as little reason for worldly pursuits, as they have for being religious._ =1.= If men can be convinced that they have as much reason to be religious as they have to practise worldly prudence, then _there is_ a reason for being religious. =2.= If religion proposes greater than worldly interests, and has the same reasons for belief, then it has proportionally a greater claim. =3.= If religion being left doubtful, proves it to be false, then doubts as to the success of any worldly pursuit show it to be wrong. Yet we constantly act, even in the most important affairs, without _certainty_ of being right. III. _As to the justice and goodness of God in religion._ =1.= Our business is not to vindicate God, but to learn our duty, governed as we are; which is a very different thing. It has been shown that if we knew all things, present, past, and future, and the relations of each thing to all other things, we might see to be just and good what now do not seem so: and it is probable we should. =2.= We do not say that objections against God’s justice and goodness are removed by showing the like objections against natural providence, but that they are not _conclusive_, because they apply equally to what we know to be facts. =3.= The existence of objections does not destroy the evidence of facts. The fact for instance that God rewards and punishes, though men may think it unjust. Even necessity, plead for human acts, does no more to abolish justice than it does injustice.