The Analogy of Religion to the Constitution and Course of Nature: To which are added two brief dissertations: I. On personal identity. II. On the nature of virtue.Butler, Joseph
Religion
The Analogy of Religion to the Constitution and Course of Nature: To which are added two brief dissertations: I. On personal identity. II. On the nature of virtue.
Butler, Joseph
Analogy (Religion); Apologetics -- Early works to 1800; Eschatology; Natural theology; Revelation
If the reader should here meet with any thing which he had not before
attended to, it will not be in the observations upon the constitution
and course of nature, these being all obvious, but in the application
of them; in which, though there is nothing but what appears to me
of some real weight, and therefore of great importance, yet he will
observe several things, which will appear to him of very little, if
he can think things to be of little importance, which are of any real
weight at all, upon such a subject of religion. However, the proper
force of the following treatise lies in the whole general analogy
considered together.
It is come, I know not how to be taken for granted, by many persons,
that Christianity is not so much as a subject of inquiry; but that
it is, now at length, discovered to be fictitious. Accordingly they
treat it, as if, in the present age, this were an agreed point among
all people of discernment; and nothing remained, but to set it up
as a principal subject of mirth and ridicule, as it were by way of
reprisals, for its having so long interrupted the pleasures of the
world. On the contrary, thus much at least, will be here found, not
taken for granted but proved, that any reasonable man, who will
thoroughly consider the matter, may be as much assured, as he is of his
own being, that it is not so clear a case, that there is nothing in
it. There is, I think, strong evidence of its truth; but it is certain
no one can, upon principles of reason, be satisfied of the contrary.
The practical consequence to be drawn from this, is not attended to by
every one who is concerned in it.
_May, 1736._
INTRODUCTION.
Probable evidence is essentially distinguished from demonstrative by
this, that it admits of degrees; and of all variety of them, from the
highest moral certainty, to the very lowest presumption. We cannot
indeed say a thing is probably true upon one very slight presumption
for it; because, as there may be probabilities on both sides of a
question, there may be some against it; and though there be not, yet
a slight presumption does not beget that degree of conviction, which
is implied in saying a thing is probably true. But that the slightest
possible presumption is of the nature of a probability, appears from
hence; that such low presumption, often repeated, will amount even
to moral certainty. Thus a man’s having observed the ebb and flow of
the tide to-day, affords some sort of presumption, though the lowest
imaginable, that it may happen again to-morrow: but the observation of
this event for so many days, and months, and ages together, as it has
been observed by mankind, gives us a full assurance that it will.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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