§ 40. If this be the true function of philosophy with reference to
science, several current notions of the relations of the spheres of
these disciplines may be disproved. In the first place, philosophy will
not be all the sciences regarded as one science. Science tends to unify
without any higher criticism. The various sciences already regard the
one nature as their common object, and the one system of interdependent
laws as their common achievement. The philosopher who tries to be all
science at once fails ignominiously because he tries to replace the work
of a specialist with the work of a dilettante; and if philosophy be
identical with that body of truth accumulated and organized by the
coöperative activity of scientific men, then philosophy is a name and
there is no occasion for the existence of the philosopher as such.
Secondly, philosophy will not be the assembling of the sciences; for
such would be a merely clerical work, and the philosopher would much
better be regarded as non-existent than as a book-keeper. Nor, thirdly,
is philosophy an auxiliary discipline that may be called upon in
emergencies for the solution of some baffling problem of science. A
problem defined by science must be solved in the scientific manner.
Science will accept no aid from the gods when engaged in her own
campaign, but will fight it out according to her own principles of
warfare. And as long as science moves in her own plane, she can
acknowledge no permanent barriers. There is then no need of any
superscientific research that shall replace, or piece together, or
extend the work of science. But the savant is not on this account in
possession of the entire field of knowledge. It is true that he is not
infrequently moved to such a conviction when he takes us about to view
his estates. Together we ascend up into heaven, or make our beds in
sheol, or take the wings of the morning and dwell in the uttermost parts
of the sea--and look in vain for anything that is not work done, or work
projected, by natural science. Persuade him, however, to _define_ his
estates, and he has circumscribed them. In his definition he must employ
conceptions more fundamental than the working conceptions that he
employs within his field of study. Indeed, in viewing his task as
definite and specific he has undertaken the solution of the problem of
philosophy. The logical self-consciousness has been awakened, and there
is no honorable way of putting it to sleep again. This is precisely
what takes place in any account of the generating problem of science. To
define science is to define at least one realm that is other than
science, the realm of active intellectual endeavor with its own proper
categories. One cannot reflect upon science and assign it an end, and a
method proper to that end, without bringing into the field of knowledge
a broader field of experience than the field proper to science, broader
at any rate by the presence in it of the scientific activity itself.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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