All capitals are strategic points, for the double reason that they are not only centers of communications, but also the seats of power and government. In mountainous countries there are defiles which are the only routes of exit practicable for an army; and these may be decisive in reference to any enterprise in this country. It is well known how great was the importance of the defile of Bard, protected by a single small fort, in 1800. The second kind of decisive points are accidental points of maneuver, which result from the positions of the troops on both sides. When Mack was at Ulm, in 1805, awaiting the approach of the Russian army through Moravia, the decisive point in an attack upon him was Donauwerth or the Lower Lech; for if his adversaries gained it before him he was cut off from his line of retreat, and also from the army intended to support him. On the contrary, Kray, who, in 1800, was in the same position, expected no aid from Bohemia, but rather from the Tyrol and from the army of Mélas in Italy: hence the decisive point of attack upon him was not Donauwerth, but on the opposite side, by Schaffhausen, since this would take in reverse his front of operations, expose his line of retreat, cut him off from his supporting army as well as from his base, and force him upon the Main. In the same campaign the first objective point of Napoleon was to fall upon the right of Mélas by the Saint-Bernard, and to seize his line of communications: hence Saint-Bernard, Ivrea, and Piacenza were decisive points only by reason of the march of Mélas upon Nice. It may be laid down as a general principle that the decisive points of maneuver are on that flank of the enemy upon which, if his opponent operates, he can more easily cut him off from his base and supporting forces without being exposed to the same danger. The flank opposite to the sea is always to be preferred, because it gives an opportunity of forcing the enemy upon the sea. The only exception to this is in the case of an insular and inferior army, where the attempt, although dangerous, might be made to cut it off from the fleet. If the enemy's forces are in detachments, or are too much extended, the decisive point is his center; for by piercing that, his forces will be more divided, their weakness increased, and the fractions may be crushed separately. The decisive point of a battle-field will be determined by,-- 1. The features of the ground. 2. The relation of the local features to the ultimate strategic aim. 3. The positions occupied by the respective forces. These considerations will be discussed in the chapter on battles. OBJECTIVE POINTS.