The Art of War in the Middle Ages A.D. 378-1515Oman, Charles
History
The Art of War in the Middle Ages A.D. 378-1515
Oman, Charles
Military art and science -- History -- Medieval, 500-1500; Military history, Medieval
From that day the Confederates were able to reckon their reputation
for obstinate and invincible courage, as one of the chief causes which
gave them political importance. The generals and armies who afterwards
faced them, went into battle without full confidence in themselves. It
was no light matter to engage with an enemy who would not retire before
any superiority in numbers, who was always ready for the fight, who
would neither give nor take quarter. The enemies of the Swiss found
these considerations the reverse of inspiriting before a combat: it may
almost be said that they came into the field expecting a defeat, and
therefore earned one. This fact is especially noticeable in the great
Burgundian war. If Charles the Rash himself was unawed by the warlike
renown of his enemies[93], the same cannot be said of his troops. A
large portion of his motley army could not be trusted in any dangerous
crisis: the German, Italian, and Savoyard mercenaries knew too well the
horrors of Swiss warfare, and shrank instinctively from the shock of
the phalanx of pikes. The duke might range his men in order of battle,
but he could not be sure that they would fight. The old proverb that
‘God was on the side of the Confederates’ was ever ringing in their
ears, and so they were half beaten before a blow was struck. Charles
had endeavoured to secure the efficiency of his army, by enlisting from
each warlike nation of Europe the class of troops for which it was
celebrated. The archers of England, the arquebusiers of Germany, the
light cavalry of Italy, the pikemen of Flanders, marched side by side
with the feudal chivalry of his Burgundian vassals. But the duke had
forgotten that, in assembling so many nationalities under his banner,
he had thrown away the cohesion which is all-important in battle.
Without mutual confidence or certainty that each comrade would do his
best for the common cause, the soldiery would not stand firm. Granson
was lost merely because the nerve of the infantry failed them at the
decisive moment, although they had not yet been engaged.
[Illustration: BATTLE OF GRANSON, 1476.]
[Illustration: BATTLE OF MORAT, 1476.
A. _Burgundian Entrenched Position, weakly held._
B. _The Duke and his Main Body, coming up in disorder to occupy
the Position._
C. _Blockading force South of Morat, Italians under Troylus._
D. _Spot where this force was driven into the Lake._
E. _Blockading force North of Morat, Savoyards under Romont._]
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