It is well known that Kant put the leading principle of his Ethics into another quite different shape, in which it is expressed directly; the first being indirect, indeed nothing more than an indication as to how the principle is to be sought for. Beginning at p. 63 (R., p. 55), he prepares the way for his second formula by means of very strange, ambiguous, not to say distorted,[1] definitions of the conceptions =End= and =Means=, which may be much more simply and correctly denoted thus: an =End= is the direct motive of an act of the Will, a =Means= the indirect: _simplex sigillum veri_ (simplicity is the seal of truth). Kant, however, slips through his wonderful enunciations to the statement: "=Man=, indeed every rational being, exists =as an end in himself=." On this I must remark that "to exist as an end in oneself==" is an unthinkable expression, a _contradictio in adjecto_.[2] To be an end means to be an object of volition. Every end can only exist in relation to a will, whose end, _i.e._, (as above stated), whose direct motive it is. Only thus can the idea, "end" have any sense, which is lost as soon as such connection is broken. But this relation, which is essential to the thing, necessarily excludes every "in itself." "End in oneself" is exactly like saying: "Friend in oneself;--enemy in oneself;--uncle in oneself;--north or east in itself;--above or below in itself;" and so on. At bottom the "end in itself" is in the same case as the "absolute ought"; the same thought--the theological--secretly, indeed, unconsciously lies at the root of each as its condition. Nor is the "absolute worth," which is supposed to be attached to this alleged, though unthinkable, "end in itself," at all better circumstanced. It also must be characterised, without pity, as a _contradictio in adjecto_. Every "worth" is a valuation by comparison, and its bearing is necessarily twofold. First, it is =relative=, since it exists for some one; and secondly, it is =comparative=, as being compared with something else, and estimated accordingly. Severed from these two conditions, the conception, "worth," loses all sense and meaning, and so obviously, that further demonstration is needless. But more: just as the phrases "end in itself" and "absolute worth" outrage logic, so true morality is outraged by the statement on p. 65 (R., p. 56), that irrational beings (that is, animals) are =things=, and should therefore be treated simply as =means=, which are not at the same time ends. In harmony with this, it is expressly declared in the _Metaphysische Anfanggründe der Tugendlehre,_ § 16: "A man can have no duties towards any being, except towards his fellow-men;" and then, § 17, we read: "To treat animals cruelly runs counter to the duty of man =towards himself=; because it deadens the feeling of sympathy for them in their sufferings, and thus weakens a natural tendency which is very serviceable to morality in relation to =other men=." So