She immediately took advantage of this and turned sharp to the north, calculating with luck to fall in force upon their rear and subject them to a raking fire. The Japanese in their reports fix the time of this movement differently; some at 2.40 P.M., others at 2.50 P.M. (the moment of the sinking of the _Oslyabya_, which under the concentrated fire of six of Admiral Kamimura’s armoured cruisers had left the line even before the _Suvoroff_). According to my own calculations, the latter time was the more likely to be correct. If the enemy’s fleet had turned “in succession,” as it had done at the commencement of the battle, this manœuvre of the _Alexander’s_ might have been successful, but, realising the gravity of the moment, Togo, on this occasion, gave the order to turn 16 points to port “together.” The manœuvre was not altogether successful. The 1st squadron (_Mikasa_, _Shikishima_, _Fuji_, _Asahi_, _Kasuga_, and _Nisshin_) performed it correctly, but Kamimura, with his cruisers--probably not having made out the signal and expecting the order to turn “in succession” on to the former course--quickly passed our fleet as well as his own battleships (which were on the opposite course), and masked their fire. He then had plenty of room to turn (he turned “in succession”) and, after overtaking the battleships, to form single column line ahead. For a moment confusion prevailed, for which the Japanese might have paid dearly, but owing to its condition our fleet was unable to reap the advantage. Making full use of their speed, the Japanese not only succeeded in righting their distances, but attained their object, _i.e._ came out across the _Alexander’s_ course, forcing her to the south.